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Abstract
In this paper, we link the peril of asylum seekers’ migratory journey to eco-
nomically quantifiable outcomes in the destination country using refugee survey
data from Germany collected in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis. We
start by showing that, accounting for selection effects, physical victimisation dur-
ing the journey to Germany is strongly associated with significantly lower men-
tal well-being and general health upon arrival in the destination. The physical
victimisation experience severely distorts the human capital investment decision
by leading affected refugees to favour joining the labour force and engaging in
part-time and marginal employment over pursuing host-country education. We
place our findings into both the psychiatric and experimental economic literature,
which suggest that experiencing physical trauma in vulnerable situations results
in a "loss of future directedness" or "impatience" among the victimised, leading
them to discount future payoffs more heavily.
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One of the key features of humanitarian migration flows from developing into developed re-
gions of the world is the significant risk these journeys entail for individuals who embark on
them. According to the International Organisation for Migration’s (IOM) Missing Migrant
database, around 15,000 migrants perished in the Mediterranean Sea alone when trying to
reach the territory of European Union (EU) member states between 2015 and 2019. Asy-
lum seekers who survive the perilous journey often do not come out unscathed: They are
subjected to violent acts on their journey carried out by escape agents and border enforce-
ment agencies, with detrimental consequences for their physical and mental health [Albahari,
2018, Arsenijević et al., 2017, 2018]. Against the backdrop of a subdued economic and soci-
etal integration of newly-arriving humanitarian migrants in the EU [Brell et al., 2020], the
potentially negative consequences of these victimisation events for future life trajectories of
affected individuals -and thus the welfare of hosting countries- has increasingly found its way
into the political debate. For example, the European Commission [2020] notes that "mental
health is critical to migrants’ integration" [p. 3] and "especially refugees, may be at higher
risk of developing mental health problems due to [...] difficulties encountered during their
migration journey" [p. 13].
In this paper, we explicitly analyse the potentially disruptive role of asylum seeker vic-
timisation during their journey to safety for their economic activity in Germany, the main
destination country of asylum seeker inflows into the EU. To analyse this link, we deploy
novel refugee survey data collected in the aftermath of the large inflows of asylum seekers
into the country in 2015/2016. We use this data to construct a physical and a financial vic-
timisation indicator for each refugee based on detailed questions regarding negative events
individuals experienced along the journey to Germany. We then link the survey to adminis-
trative employment biography data to study how both physical and financial victimisation
affect refugees’ economic activity trajectories upon arrival in the host country. To allow
for a causal interpretation of our estimated coefficients, we control for a wide range of pre-
migration characteristics and limit the variation in the data to narrowly defined fixed effects
categories relating to the country of origin interacted with the exact month of departure, to
within arrival cohorts and a measure of the geographical route taken to reach Germany.
Our results show that physically victimised asylum seekers in particular suffer from sig-
nificantly lower life satisfaction as well as poorer physical and mental health upon arrival.
While we detect no distortions at the external margin of economic activity, physically vic-
timised refugees are less likely to invest into host-country education but take up employment
faster than non-victimised and financially victimised migrants. This leads to the intuitively
paradoxical finding of a higher employment rate among physically victimised refugees vis-à-
vis other refugees in the early years upon arrival, an adjusted gap reaching 4.4 percentage
points 31 months into refugees’ stay in Germany. We show that this excess employment
among the physically victimised is driven by marginal and part-time employment, work that
is characterised by a lower level of income relative to other refugees. We further document
larger financial hardship among the financially victimised but do not find distortionary ef-
fects on the human capital investment decision for this subgroup. Our findings thus suggest
that, in line with previous research, physical victimisation has stronger effects on affected
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individuals’ behaviour [Dolan et al., 2005, Mahuteau and Zhu, 2016, Johnston et al., 2018].
To conceptualise our findings, we draw on evidence from the sociology, psychiatry and
economics literature. Evidence from sociology and psychiatry documents a "loss of future
directedness" caused by potentially traumatic victimisation events [Beiser, 1987, Hauff and
Vaglum, 1993a, Hunkler and Khourshed, 2020, Sagbakken et al., 2020]. As physically trau-
matized refugees adopt a more pessimistic outlook on life and discount their future more
heavily, they tend to invest less into host-country specific education and are more likely to
take up low-skill employment soon after arrival. Similarly, the experimental economics lit-
erature shows that time preferences can be affected by extreme events linked to violence,
making victimised individuals more impatient in their decision-making [Voors et al., 2012,
Callen et al., 2014, Jakiela and Ozier, 2019, Brown et al., 2019]. While these effects are not
directly distinguishable from a general decline in mental well-being in our setting, one of the
key strengths of our study is that the granular survey data allows us to rule out a number
of competing theories that could explain our findings. These range from institutional mech-
anisms in-built into German asylum procedures to mechanisms related to financial hardship
and other behavioural changes caused by victimisation events. Since the first survey inter-
views were conducted close to the arrival date of asylum seekers, our findings do not face
the standard issue of reverse causality when linking victimisation and the resulting decline
in mental well-being to individuals’ labour market attachment [Brown et al., 2010, Kassen-
boehmer and Haisken-DeNew, 2009]. The relatively large number of observed individuals
further allows us to split our sample along a range of dimensions. We show that all our
findings are robust to restricting the sample to recognised refugees, hold for the subgroup of
Syrians who receive protection with near certainty, and are driven by both males and females.
Our identification strategy relies on the random nature of victimisation among asylum
seekers. We identify and group three main empirical challenges to a causal interpretation
of the effect of victimization on labour market and health outcomes. First, a non-random
selection at the country of origin at different expected victimisation rates may lead specific
subsets of asylum seekers to choose Germany as their destination (selection at origin bias). If
these groups show unobserved characteristics that also causally impact integration outcomes,
estimated coefficients on the effect of victimisation will be biased. A second source of poten-
tial bias may arise from the fact that only those who succeed in making it to Germany are
observed in our sample. This group may represent a sub-group of, for instance, particularly
motivated or resilient individuals (survivor bias). Finally, victimisation itself may be cor-
related with other unobserved factors that determine the economic integration in Germany
(omitted variable bias). To address selection at origin and survivor bias, we show that our
baseline results are robust to a wide range of empirical specifications that limit variation to
narrowly defined fixed effects categories. These fixed effects relate to the country of origin of
asylum seekers, interacted with their precise time of departure and arrival. We show that,
conditional on the geographical origin and the timing of migration, baseline differences be-
tween physically and non-physically-victimised groups indeed disappear, leaving us with a
sample balanced along a large range of observable characteristics. By combining these bal-
ance tests with coefficient stability tests developed by Oster [2019], we are able to credibly
rule out omitted variable bias as a driver of our results in all linear regressions. The rich
survey data further allows us to add precision to our estimates by selecting controls for a wide
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range of pre-migration and post-migration characteristics based on both economic theory and
machine learning techniques. Taken together, throughout our analysis, we thus compare vic-
timised and non-victimised refugees with similar pre-migration and selected post-migration
characteristics, who originate from the same country, migrated in the same year-month, took
the same migration route and are part of the same arrival cohort.
Our study adds to the existing literature in a number of ways. We primarily add to the
literature that links refugee victimisation to their economic behavioural response in the host
country [Couttenier et al., 2019, Hunkler and Khourshed, 2020, Hauff and Vaglum, 1993a].
Unlike previous literature, our data allows us to explicitly focus on events asylum seekers
endured during their journey as opposed to their country of origin, an important distinction
for the design of asylum policies. Since victimisation of asylum seekers is interconnected with
the choice of external border policies [Arsenijević et al., 2017, 2018], we further contribute
to the growing literature on how asylum-seeker specific policies shape refugee labour market
integration [Damm, 2009, Battisti et al., 2016, Hainmueller et al., 2016, Marbach et al., 2018,
Zwysen, 2019]. One of the main takeaways of our study is that a rapid labour market integra-
tion as a general success metric for integration outcomes should be treated with care; higher
victimisation rates may contribute to a relatively swift uptake of employment, nevertheless
distorting optimal labour market matching. We further add to the recently developing stream
of literature that links crime victimisation to labour market outcomes more generally [Bindler
and Ketel, 2019]. We show that this link is context-specific and the perilous journey asylum
seekers go through may not be easily compared to other settings. Finally, we also add to the
much broader literature on violence and the human-capital investment decision by providing
further evidence that experiencing traumatic events in conflict and high-crime settings lowers
the willingness to invest in education [Blattman and Annan, 2010, Shemyakina, 2011, Leon,
2012, Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014, Koppensteiner and Menezes, forthcoming].
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the con-
ceptual framework that links the victimisation experience to economic activity outcomes in
the destination country in more detail. Section three discusses our data sources and profiles
victimised vis-à-vis non-victimised migrants. Section four introduces the estimation strat-
egy and our approach to dealing with self-selection and survivor bias in detail. Section five
shows the main results and section six discusses their robustness. In section seven, we test
alternative hypotheses that could explain our findings. Section eight provides a concluding
discussion.
2 Related literature and research hypotheses
Some evidence exists on the direct disruptive effect of victimisation events on affected individ-
uals’ future economic outcomes for the general (Western) population without an explicit focus
on migrants or refugees. These studies unequivocally find negative consequences of victimisa-
tion regarding labour force participation, employment, earned income and increased welfare
dependency [Bindler and Ketel, 2019, Ornstein, 2017, Velamuri and Stillman, 2008]. Other
studies, primarily on developing countries, have documented distortions to the human-capital
investment decision following potentially traumatic events in conflict-related or high-crime
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settings[Blattman and Annan, 2010, Shemyakina, 2011, Leon, 2012, Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014,
Koppensteiner and Menezes, forthcoming]. A larger literature is concerned with the effect of
victimisation on health and mental well-being outcomes, the structural mechanism linking
victimisation events to disruptions in other areas of life and economic outcomes in particular.
For example, Mahuteau and Zhu [2016] find that physical victimisation decreases subjective
well-being. Dolan et al. [2005] estimate a measure of ’loss in quality-adjusted life years’ to
quantify the cost to victims and show that rape, followed by other serious physical assault
decreases victims’ quality-adjusted life years the most. Johnston et al. [2018] focus on the
effect of crime victimisation on life satisfaction as an encompassing measure of mental well-
being and find that physical assault and events that lead to a major worsening of affected
individuals’ financial situation have the strongest negative effect on life satisfaction for both
men and women.
Despite these clear findings for the general population, it is crucial to note that the sit-
uation of asylum seekers who arrive in their host-country is unique and the extent to which
general studies apply to migrants’ victimisation experience requires a careful reflection. Un-
like samples of victimised individuals drawn from the general population or other migrant
groups, forcefully displaced migrants all start their economic activity trajectory at zero upon
arrival. This has major implications for their choice set with respect to the host-country
labour market and potential distortions to these choices caused by a victimisation event.
Since the majority of refugees originate from countries where educational attainment is not
regarded as equivalent to education in economically advanced countries, or lack proof of their
formal degrees, refugees from less developed countries face the decision to i) either join the
labour force immediately and accept a discount on their educational attainment they face in
Western countries and take up low-skill, low-paid employment or ii) invest into host-country
specific human capital to have access to better paid employment later on [Duleep and Regets,
1999, Cortes, 2004].
Evidence from both the sociology and psychiatric literature suggests that victimisation
experiences have lasting effects on future-oriented planning. In a study closest to ours, Hauff
and Vaglum [1993a] analyse a cohort of 145 Vietnamese refugees in Norway one year and three
years after arrival. The authors find that those who experienced more potentially traumatic
events were more likely to be in the labour force but tend to invest less into host-country
specific education. In a separate study on the same cohort, the authors find a persistently
worse mental health status among those who experienced traumatic events even seven years
after arrival vis-à-vis the non-traumatised [Hauff and Vaglum, 1993b]. In combination, these
findings suggest that experiencing trauma under extreme conditions may either trigger a
behavioural change on the short-term versus long-term trade-off independent of the effect
of victimisation on mental health or as a direct consequence of it. In a more recent study,
Hunkler and Khourshed [2020] evaluate the integration outcomes of 252 Syrian refugees in
Germany’s federal state of Bavaria and broadly confirm the findings by Hauff and Vaglum
[1993a]. The authors find that refugees who experienced potentially traumatic events in their
country of origin or on their journey to Germany show better German language skills but
their labour market outcomes do not differ from the non-victimised, a curious finding con-
sidering the clearly established link between language skills and economic integration success
[Dustmann and Soest, 2001].
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The tendency of refugees to adopt a more present-oriented mindset following extreme
potentially traumatic episodes can be traced back in the psychiatric literature until Beiser
[1987]. The author finds that refugees who went through extreme events while fleeing their
country have a shortened sense of future, a potential explanation for favouring early em-
ployment over long-term educational investment. In a more recent study, Sagbakken et al.
[2020] interview 78 asylum seekers in Norway and find that a loss of future directedness
leads traumatized asylum seekers to "withdraw into passivity" [p. 1]. Research on self-harm
and suicide among refugees show that the lack of future orientation also manifests itself into
higher rates of suicide in these segments of the population, especially when having endured
extreme traumatic events [Goosen et al., 2011, Hawton, 2009, Lerner et al., 2016].
These findings that relate traumatic events refugees endure to a lack of future-oriented
planning find further support in recent experimental studies in the economics literature.
While classic economic models assume that preferences are stable over time and unaffected
by life-time experiences [Stigler and Becker, 1977], recent experimental studies suggest that
individuals’ risk aversion and time preferences can indeed be affected by extreme events
linked to violence [Voors et al., 2012, Callen et al., 2014, Jakiela and Ozier, 2019, Brown
et al., 2019], natural disasters [Eckel et al., 2009, Page et al., 2014, Callen, 2015, Cameron
and Shah, 2015, Cassar et al., 2017, Hanaoka et al., 2018, Beine et al., 2020], health shocks
[Decker and Schmitz, 2016], and financial and macroeconomic shocks [Guiso et al., 2018, Jet-
ter et al., 2020, Malmendier and Nagel, 2011, Kettlewell, 2019]. The time preferences have in
turn been found to affect decisions regarding borrowing [Meier and Sprenger, 2010], savings
[Thaler and Benartzi, 2004] and financial literacy [Meier and Sprenger, 2013] among adults,
and investment and human capital acquisition among the younger [Sutter et al., 2013, Ca-
dena and Keys, 2015, Kemptner and Tolan, 2018]. Our analysis relates to this literature by
indirectly measuring the time preferences of victimized versus non-victimized individuals.1
This possible interpretation is based on the assumption that individuals indirectly reveal
their time preferences by engaging in certain activities [DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005].
Individuals who attach higher value to long-term rewards are more likely to pursue activities
that entail an immediate cost (such as investing in human capital) but which have delayed
payoffs (access to higher quality employment in the future). On the other hand, impatient
individuals are more likely to engage in activities which have immediate benefits (such as
low-income employment) and delayed costs (lack of access to higher quality employment in
the future).
In summary, we derive two hypotheses regarding the effect of victimisation events asylum
seekers experience on their journey to Europe and their potential to cause disruptions with
respect to economic integration. The first relates to refugees’ decision to become econom-
ically active (e.g., participate in the labour force or acquire education) in the host-country
at all. This is what we refer to as the external margin of economic activity: Previous
studies on the victimisation-mental health-economic activity nexus predict lower economic
1Voors et al. [2012], for instance, find that individuals who were exposed to greater levels of violence
display more altruistic behaviour, are more risk-seeking, and have higher time discount rates. Similarly,
Cassar et al. [2017] conduct a series of experiments in rural Thailand and find that the 2004 tsunami led to
long-lasting increases in risk aversion, pro-social behaviour, and impatience
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activity among the victimised. The second hypothesis relates to the choice newly-arriving
refugees face between (i) joining the labour force and looking for employment and (ii) in-
vesting into host-country education. This is what we refer to as the internal margin of
economic activity: Victimisation during the journey may lead to disruptions regarding the
host-country human capital investment decision of victimised and non-victimised refugees
vis-a-vis the alternative of low-income employment through a loss of future directedness.
One of the limitations of our survey data is that while we are able to capture individual-
level mental well-being in several ways, it is not possible to distinguish a potential loss of
future directedness directly from a general decrease in mental well-being caused by victimisa-
tion events. We address this concern in two ways. First, the theoretical effect of victimisation
on the external and the internal margin of economic activity go into opposite directions: a
decrease in mental health is expected to lead to a lower labour market attachment while the
loss of future directedness increases early labour force participation. It is therefore possible to
settle the question empirically in parts. Second, our data allows us to rule out all alternative
theories that could explain our findings.
There are indeed a number of competing mechanisms that could explain the relation
between asylum seeker victimisation during the journey and integration outcomes. The first
relates to the institutional design of the German asylum system. If victimised individuals
received asylum faster since they have a more genuine case for protection and therefore get
access to the labour market faster upon arrival, this would mechanically link victimisation to
a faster labour market integration and could potentially bias the results. The German asylum
system has a second key institutional feature that could encourage fast employment among
specific segments of the asylum seeking population. Despite options being very limited in
scope, obtaining employment before asylum can improve the chances of receiving a temporary
protection status ("Duldung") in Germany [Brücker et al., 2019]. Finding employment upon
arrival is therefore particularly incentivised for migrants with a low probability of receiving
full protection status since employment disproportionally increases the probability of being
allowed to stay in Germany for these individuals. If these individuals with a low chance
of getting their asylum granted take higher risks on their journey to Germany (and get
victimised relatively more often), they may therefore seek employment quickly to improve
their chances of receiving asylum. We analyse these institutional mechanisms in detail in
section 7.1. The second mechanism relates to asylum seekers’ financial hardship that could
be co-determined with victimisation experiences. Smugglers have been documented to be
responsible for abuse of asylum seekers during their journey and often charge large amounts
for their services Albahari [2018]. We analyse this mechanism in section 7.2. The third
mechanism is related to the intended duration of stay in Germany. If victimised individuals
intend to stay for a relatively shorter duration than non-victimised individuals because the
difficult journey discouraged them, they could be more likely to seek low-skill employment
instead of investing into host-country specific human capital [Cortes, 2004]. We analyse this
mechanism in section 7.3 and show that our results are not driven by these hypotheses.
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3 Data and definitions
This section contains a description of all data sources and introduces the main variables of
interest and the outcomes. In the final subsection 3.4, we then turn to a first descriptive
analysis of differences between victimised and non-victimised asylum seekers to both fill a
gap in the literature and as a first motivation of our empirical strategy.
3.1 IAB-BAMF-SOEP refugee survey
The main data source for all our analyses is the IAB-BAMF-SOEP refugee survey. It is an
extension to the established German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) survey through an ad
hoc module for the target population of asylum seekers and refugees. The sampling frame
of the IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey is the German Central Register of Foreign Nationals. The
survey has a panel structure with a total of 12,311 interviews carried out in three waves in
2016, 2017 and 2018 on 6,763 individuals.
The survey contains a wide range of baseline information on pre-migration characteristics
and detailed information on individual and household characteristics, including on respon-
dents’ health. It also provides information on the time of displacement in the country of ori-
gin, within-country information on the province of origin and the time of arrival in Germany.
Most importantly for our purposes, respondents are asked detailed questions on experiences
they went through during the journey from their country of origin to Germany. 3,742 indi-
viduals, 55.2% of the total sample, agreed to provide information on these experiences. Our
effective working sample for which we have all relevant information, including all necessary
control variables and additional outcomes, consists of 2,314 individuals aged between 18 and
65.
Within these questions, our main interest lies on the survey question ’During the jour-
ney or escape, did you experience one or more of the following?’ which allow surveyees to
choose one or more answers from a list of negative experiences. Based on their responses, we
create a binary physical victimization indicator taking the value 1 if an individual was
subjected to sexual abuse, physical attacks, incarceration or shipwreck (or any combination
of these). We further create a binary financial victimization indicator taking the value
1 if an individual was subjected to financial fraud, extortion, robbery or blackmail, or any
combination of these. The summary statistics for the two victimisation indicators are shown
in table 1.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Experienced robbery 0.133 0.34 0 1
Experienced extortion 0.155 0.362 0 1
Experienced fraud 0.287 0.452 0 1
Financial victimisation 0.39 0.488 0 1
Experienced sexual harassment 0.017 0.129 0 1
Experienced shipwreck 0.137 0.344 0 1
Experienced physical attack 0.134 0.341 0 1
Experienced incarceration 0.201 0.401 0 1
Physical victimisation 0.359 0.48 0 1
N 2314
Table 1: Physical and financial victimization indicator
We note that by design of these indicators, individuals may experience both a financial
and a physical trauma. Reassuringly, the correlation between these two (r=0.3) is suffi-
ciently low not to be a cause for concern in our regression analyses. We further note that
some migrants experienced more than one victimisation event, but nevertheless model our
preferred indicators as binary for two main reasons. First, the majority of migrants experi-
enced one victimisation event. Only 11% of all individuals in our sample experienced more
than one physical victimisation event and 15% experienced more than one financial victimi-
sation event. Second, there is no clear guidance in the victimisation literature on the correct
functional form of the relation between our outcomes of interest and multiple victimisation
events individuals experience during their flight to safety that lasted for 40 days on average.
We explore this question further by relaxing the assumption of no additional behavioural
effect when individuals experience additional victimisation events in section 6.1.
Important to our analysis, from the second wave of the survey onwards, individuals who
were willing to answer questions regarding their escape journey were explicitly asked which
route they took to reach their destination. We assign their answers to the five main migration
routes: (1) The Eastern Mediterranean sea route, (2) the Central Mediterranean route, (3)
the Western Mediterranean route, (4) the Eastern Mediterranean land route, (5) the East-
ern Land border route and (6) travelling directly to Germany by plane. Since the survey
questions on the route taken contain many missing values in the first wave of the survey,
we impute the routes using an additional source of information. Individuals were invited to
report on a virtual map all locations they passed through on their migratory journey from
their country of origin to Germany. We use this data and apply the method developed by
Guichard et al. [2021] to extract the geo-referenced points, infer the migration route and clas-
sify these to match the five first routes.2 Applying these methods allows us to recover route
2The authors start by assigning the geo-coded points to all countries, and define a sequence of countries for
each migration route. Secondly, they identify the last country before an individual entered the Schengen area
and the first location in the Schengen zone. A path is assigned to (1) the Eastern Mediterranean sea route
if the last non-Schengen country was Turkey and the first Schengen country was Greece; (2) the Central
Mediterranean route if the last non-Schengen country was Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, or Turkey and the first
Schengen country was Italy or Malta; (3) the Western Mediterranean route if the last non-Schengen country
was Morocco or Algeria and the first Schengen country was Spain or France; (4) the Eastern Mediterranean
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information for 77 % of the sample. We assign the remaining 23 % to a seventh category (7),
no route information.
We then draw on the psychiatric and health economics literature reviewed in section 2
and use four main indicators to measure mental well-being and the general health of vic-
timised and non-victimised refugees. Following Johnston et al. [2018], we use life satisfaction
measured on a scale from 1 to 10 (with 10 being the highest), an encompassing measure of
mental well-being, as our primary outcome of the mental health effect of victimisation. We
complement this measure with a measure of self-assessed health (1-10), a mental component
score (MCS) and a physical component score (PCS). The MCS is a standardised mental
health index, based on six questions related to emotional and psychological problems and
how these impact on daily activities [Nübling et al., 2006]. The factor loadings of the ques-
tions are used as weights and the score is then normed to range from 0 to 100. Similarly, the
physical health index is constructed based on six questions related to physical health. We
provide all details on the construction of the MCS and the PCS in section A of the appendix.
The four measures are summarised in table 2, together with the backward-reported measures
of pre-migration life-satisfaction and pre-migration self-reported health.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Life satisfaction before migration (1-10) 7.09 2.839 0 10 2314
Health before migration (1-10) 8.339 2.419 0 10 2314
Current Life Satisfaction (1-10) 7.166 2.125 0 10 2314
Health after migration (1-10) 7.9 2.434 0 10 2314
MCS: Mental Component Scale 48.346 11.298 4.626 73.259 2277
PCS: Physical Component Scale 53.444 9.966 13.487 77.651 2277
Table 2: Mental well-being and health indicators
Finally, for the economic integration outcomes, our main interest lies on three measures:
The external margin of economic activity, defined by those in the labour force and those
in education or training. In the second step, we zoom into the generic economic activity
indicator and break it up into those in the labour force and those in education and training
to uncover potential distortions to the timing of entering the labour force caused by victim-
isation. We complement our main analyses with an analyses on employment rates, further
split up into full-time, part-time and marginal employment, and net monthly income. These
are shown in table 3 for the last observation available of each individual in the panel.
land route if the last non-Schengen country was Turkey and the first EU country was Bulgaria; (5) the
Eastern Land border route if the last non-Schengen country was Romania, Ukraine, or Belarus, and the first
Schengen country was Poland, Slovakia, or Hungary.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Economically active 0.759 0.428 0 1 2314
Labour Force Participation 0.741 0.438 0 1 2314
Education or training 0.078 0.268 0 1 2314
Education or training 0.078 0.268 0 1 2314
Employed 0.218 0.413 0 1 2314
Full-time employed 0.109 0.312 0 1 2314
Part-time or marginally employed 0.109 0.312 0 1 2314
Net income 892.736 571.574 0 3100 440
Table 3: Economic activity indicators
3.2 IAB integrated employment biographies
We use the IAB integrated employment biographies (IEB) to complement the employment
labour market survey questions with more reliable individual administrative records. The
IEB consist of all individuals in Germany who are characterised by at least one of the fol-
lowing employment status: employment subject to social security (in the data since 1975),
marginal part-time employment (in the data since 1999), benefit receipt according to the
German Social Code III or II, officially registered as job-seeking at the German Federal Em-
ployment Agency or (planned) participation in programs of active labour market policies (in
the data since 2000). The social security notifications are filled by the employer for each em-
ployment relationship. Unique establishment identifiers allow collapsing the employee level
(e.g. Establishment History Panel (BHP)) and to link workers, establishments and surveys
(e.g. Linked-Employer-Employee-Data (LIAB)). The IEB is a comprehensive data set with
no attrition and daily precision.
While the IEB data can only be linked to the survey questions for a 70% subset of our
sample for a total of 1625 individuals and we therefore rely on employment outcomes in the
survey data in our primary analyses, the more precise job market data with a longitudinal
character adds three major components. First, it provides us with the exact date of the
first job refugees took up in Germany, allowing us to address the question of the timing of
employment uptake in greater detail. Second, the linkage allows us to follow refugees even
when they leave the survey, mitigating attrition concerns. Finally, it also allows us to obtain
information on refugees’ pre-survey (un)employment history.
3.3 Further data sources
All survey information are further linked to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and to the
Syrian Shuhada Martyr Revolution database on the province-month level. These databases
report aggregate number of fatalities by province and month between 2011 and 2019 for
all countries of origin found among the refugee population in Germany. We use these data
to calculate control variables for potentially traumatic experiences in the origin, which we
proxy in two steps. First, we construct a province-specific conflict-related death count in the
province of origin, defined as the three months rolling average of conflict related fatalities
prior to departure. As argued by Aksoy and Poutvaara [2019], simple province-level death
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counts may not adequately capture conflict intensity, as all variation in the variable may come
from few historically war-ridden countries with substantially different institutional settings.








For each country and month t− μ, we then calculate the median conflict intensity, M , of all
provinces and create three categories:
No conflict: All individuals departing at t− μ for whom ConflictIntensityc,t−μ = 0
Low conflict: All individuals departing at t− μ for whom ConflictIntensityc,t−μ < M
High conflict: All individuals departing at t− μ for whom ConflictIntensityc,t−μ ≥ M
Thus, the conflict intensity measure is calculated based on within-country conflict varia-
tion over time3. The calculated variables are summarised in table 4.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
No conflict 0.096 0.295 0 1
Low conflict 0.362 0.481 0 1
High conflict 0.542 0.498 0 1
N 2314
Table 4: Conflict intensity
3.4 Victimisation along the migration route to Germany
To the best of our knowledge, no systematically gathered statistics exist on the hardship asy-
lum seekers endure during their journey to Europe. In 2014, the International Organisation
of Migration’s (IOM) "Missing Migrant" project started tracking fatalities along the main
migration routes but the database does not feature information on survivors. Two findings
from observational studies are relevant to our study. First, victimisation is frequent and
leaves asylum seekers mentally scarred. Arsenijević et al. [2017] evaluate data on 992 asylum
seekers on their way to Europe collected from Médecins sans Frontières’ mobile mental health
clinics in Serbia in 2015 and 2016. Almost a third of the asylum seekers transiting through
Serbia was classified as physically traumatised by the medical staff. Second, perpetrators of
violence are both state actors and people smugglers asylum seekers rely on to cross borders
and the Mediterranean Sea [Albahari, 2018, Arsenijević et al., 2017]. Less is known about
individual and circumstantial factors that lead to victimisation on the journey to Europe and
to what extent these events are of random nature. Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that
crime victimisation is not limited to groups traditionally seen as vulnerable. For example,
Arsenijević et al. [2018] show that young male migrants are often the victims of physical
3An alternative solution to the problem Aksoy and Poutvaara outline would be to use the death count
measure in combination with country by year-of-departure fixed effects.
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assault and suffer severe mental health problems due to these events.
To shed more light on victimisation events endured by asylum seekers during their journey
to Europe, we start out by presenting more detailed descriptive statistics comparing group
characteristics of non-victimised, physically victimised and financially victimised migrants.
We exploit the rich set of questions relating to both pre-migration characteristics of refugees
and information related to their escape available in the IAB-BAMF-SOEP refugee survey.
We utilise this information to explicitly profile refugees who were physically or financially
victimised on their journey to Germany vis-à-vis the non-victimised refugee population along
seven key dimensions: a) individual-level baseline characteristics, b) countries of origin, c)
individual health status, d) psychological characteristics, e) reasons for migrating to Germany,
f) financing of the escape, and g) route characteristics. These profiles are presented as








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































It is first worth noting that the 36% of asylum seekers reporting physical victimisation as
defined in the previous section is slightly above the share found by Arsenijević et al. [2017]
whose data gathered in Serbia exclude the final stage of the journey to Germany. A further
39% of asylum seekers report financial victimisation on their journey and 46% of asylum
seekers did not experience criminal victimisation, implying some overlap between physical
and financial victimisation events.
Table 5 suggest that the group composition of non-victimised and victimised migrants
differ along a range of dimensions. In summary, the victimised groups show some signs of be-
ing less likely to show features generically considered vulnerable. Victimised migrants are on
average younger, less likely to be female and have fewer children. The victimised groups also
show characteristics that can be classified as greater determination to reach Germany: On
average, both physically and financially victimised asylum seekers spend larger amounts on
their escape, take more perilous sea routes to Germany instead of arriving by plane, travel for
longer and are more likely to travel alone. The differences we observe around the geography
of victimisation are intuitive: For example, asylum seekers from Syria are likely to be at a
higher risk of victimisation on their journey to Germany than an asylum seeker from Kosovo
simply due to the fact that Syrians have to travel a longer distance and spend more time
exposed to potential perpetrators of violence. Similarly, victimisation rates will intuitively
differ by travel route and means of transport: For instance, flying into Germany from Syria
is safer than crossing the Eastern Mediterranean Sea in a boat provided by an escape agent.
Both the geography and route chosen may therefore reflect underlying financial constraints,
which in turn correlate with other socio-economic characteristics. Finally, the timing of mi-
gration may further contribute to the observed differences as it likely reflect selection effects
at different expected victimisation rates: For instance, relatively vulnerable migrants may
choose not to migrate when the risk of getting victimised is high.
To systematically analyse these issues, we proceed as follows. We first show that, after
balancing on the geographic origin, the migration route taken and the timing of migration,
observed average group characteristics between victimised and non-victimised are very sim-
ilar. We then use these first descriptive insights to structure our thinking regarding the
empirical strategy when studying the effect of individual-level victimization during the jour-
ney on economic integration outcomes of refugees in Germany.
Table 6 shows a balance test conditional on the selection dynamics outlined above, under
the null hypotheses that individual-level characteristics do not predict victimisation events.
To test these multiple hypotheses, the physical victimisation indicator and the financial vic-
timisation indicator are regressed on a set of backward reported pre-migration indicators
respectively, conditional on their geographical origin, the time of migration (and their in-
teraction term), and the migration route. Physical victimisation is further conditioned on
having experienced financial victimisation, while financial victimisation is conditioned on the
experience of physical victimisation. The regression outcomes are shown in column (1) and
(2). Column (3) and (4) then also condition on the the time of arrival.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Physical Victim. Financial Victim. Physical Victim. Financial Victim.
Female 0.00228 -0.0182 0.00346 -0.0172
(0.0245) (0.0268) (0.0246) (0.0268)
Age 0.00183 -0.00335 0.00158 -0.00385
(0.00630) (0.00662) (0.00631) (0.00663)
Age squared -6.21e-05 1.31e-05 -5.93e-05 1.77e-05
(8.21e-05) (8.71e-05) (8.22e-05) (8.72e-05)
Willingness to take risk 0.00110 0.00325 0.00110 0.00338
(0.00310) (0.00327) (0.00310) (0.00327)
Resilience -0.00163 -0.000257 -0.00165 -0.000376
(0.00310) (0.00329) (0.00310) (0.00330)
Life satisfaction BFM -0.00158 0.00842* -0.00167 0.00803*
(0.00473) (0.00484) (0.00473) (0.00486)
Health satisfaction BFM -0.00340 -0.0187*** -0.00330 -0.0185***
(0.00514) (0.00527) (0.00515) (0.00527)
Employed BFM 0.0265 0.0583** 0.0271 0.0579**
(0.0270) (0.0285) (0.0270) (0.0285)
Education: Secondary 0.0238 0.0914*** 0.0229 0.0882***
(0.0280) (0.0293) (0.0280) (0.0293)
Education: Vocational -0.0379 -0.0199 -0.0392 -0.0218
(0.0408) (0.0427) (0.0408) (0.0427)
Education: Tertiary -0.0471* 0.0636** -0.0490* 0.0581**
(0.0263) (0.0291) (0.0265) (0.0291)
German skills BFM: Good -0.165* -0.193** -0.159 -0.171*
(0.0984) (0.0879) (0.0991) (0.0887)
Economic Situation BFM < Avg 0.0231 -0.0103 0.0225 -0.00998
(0.0289) (0.0303) (0.0289) (0.0303)
Friends helped to move -0.0404 -0.0829*** -0.0399 -0.0868***
(0.0253) (0.0268) (0.0253) (0.0267)
Arrived alone 0.00759 -0.00336 0.00817 -0.00503
(0.0266) (0.0279) (0.0266) (0.0279)
Observations 2,314 2,314 2,314 2,314
R-squared 0.229 0.158 0.230 0.163
Country of origin x Y-M left origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Migration Route FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE No No Yes Yes
Physical Victimisation Yes No Yes No
Financial Victimisation No Yes No Yes
Huber-White SE
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
Note: BFM stands for backward reported "before migration" information. The term FE indicates fixed effects. The term cohort
refers to the year-month of arrival in Germany. Willingness to take risk, Life satisfaction BFM and Health satisfaction BFM
are measured on a scale from 1 (low) to 10 (very high). The baseline category for the education variable is below secondary
education. The baseline category for the dummy variable "German skills BFM: Good" is no or very limited German skills before
migration. The baseline for the dummy variable "Economic Situation BFM < Avg" is "Economic Situation BFM > Avg" and
refers to the economic situation of individuals compared to the population in their country of origin. "Friends helped to move"
and "Arrived alone" are dummy variables capturing if migrants received help from friends during their migratory journey and
whether they arrived alone respectively.
Table 6: Conditional balance test
The results show a much more balanced sample for the physically victimised (columns 1
and 3). We note that, on average, tertiary educated individuals and those who spoke German
before their forced displacement are slightly less likely to fall victim to physical attacks. This
difference is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level (1), is no longer visible for
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the German language indicator when conditioned on cohort fixed effects (3) and could be the
result of multiple hypotheses testing. Nevertheless, our estimations will routinely control for
these variables. Experiencing financial victimisation, on the other hands is unsurprisingly
correlated with indicators that identify the wealth status of individuals (columns (2) and
(4)). Higher levels of education and employment before migration both predict financial
victimisation events, likely due to the necessary condition of initial financial endowment to
suffer from financial losses. Our data allows us to control for a wide range of pre-migration
wealth indicators, mitigating the issue. Similarly, individuals who could rely on friends
to help with their migratory journey - and are therefore less likely to be involved with
escape agents - show a lower probability of victimisation on average. Finally, life and health
satisfaction are further significant predictors of financial victimisation, albeit in opposing
directions. Our suggestive interpretation is that life satisfaction is correlated with financial
victimisation via its link to financial endowment, whereas individuals of relatively worse pre-
migration health are easier targets for criminal actors. In sum, we conclude that while the
sample of physically victimised migrants is balanced along a wide range of individual level
pre-migration characteristics once conditioned on geography and the timing of migration,
financial victimisation events occur less randomly. While our data allows us to control for
a large set of potentially confounding variables to mitigate the problem, we deploy several
additional tests, outlined in 4.4, to study the significance of unobserved factors that could
bias our results.
4 Empirical strategy
As discussed in the previous section, the key assumption of the analyses in this study is that
the victimisation of individuals during their journey to Europe, when conditioned on the right
set of covariates, is a random event that affected individuals have no control over. Three
empirical problems pose a risk when trying to interpret the unconditional effect of individual-
level victimization on integration outcomes: First, a non-random selection at the country of
origin at different levels of expected victimisation may lead specific groups of asylum seekers
to choose Germany as their destination (selection at origin effect). If these groups show char-
acteristics such as unobserved motivation that also causally impact on integration outcomes,
estimated coefficients on the effect of victimisation pick up bias. Second, a potential bias
may arise from the fact that only those who succeed in making it to Germany are observed
in our sample. This group may represent a sub-group of, for instance, particularly motivated
or resilient individuals (survivor bias). Finally, victimisation itself could be correlated with
other unobserved factors that determine the integration in Germany (omitted variable bias).
If, for instance, unobserved intelligence lowers the probability of victimisation and simul-
taneously improves economic decision-making in the destination, coefficients estimated on
the victimisation indicator could pick this up. We describe our strategy to deal with these
different empirical design challenges in detail in section 4.
We start by laying out our baseline specification in section 4.1 that estimates the effect
of victimisation of asylum seekers along the route to Germany on their economic integration




The rich set of background information available from the IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey data
allows us to control for pre-migration and selected post-migration characteristics that are
usually unobserved in migration studies. This allows us to reduce some concerns related to
potential unobserved variable bias.
To identify the effect of potentially traumatic events occurring during the journey to
the destination on economic integration outcomes, we start out by estimating the following
empirical model:
Yi,f,c,t =γ1PhysicalV ictimi + γ2FinancialV ictimi + ζBaselineCharacteristicsi,t (1)
+ ηPreMigCharacteristicsi,μ + ρConflictIntensityi,μ + θ1Routei,μ
+ θ2AsylumStatusi,t + θ3MSMi,t + θ4MSMsqi,t + αc + δf + τ λ̂i + εi,f,c,t
where Yi,c,t,f captures the health or economic integration outcome of interest for individ-
ual i from country of origin c interviewed at time t who resides in the German federal state
f . Both γ1 and γ2 are the coefficients estimated on the variables of interest, PhysicalV ictimi
and FinancialV ictimi.
BaselineCharacteristicsi,t is a vector of individual level characteristics. It includes
refugees’ age, age squared, a dummy for female refugees, a measure of mental resilience
and willingness to take risk and a set of dummies referring to individuals’ educational attain-
ment (ISCED-2011 categories).4 We include mental resilience as a control since more resilient
individuals might be better able to cope with distressful life events. Willingness to take risks
is controlled for to account not only for self-selection into migration but also because of its
confounding effect on time preferences. For the labour force participation, education and
health related outcomes we include two categorical variables related to the residence of the
spouse and to the location of the children.5 For the health related outcomes, we further
include a continuous variable reflecting the satisfaction with living arrangements, measured
on a scale from 1 to 10.
PreMigrationCharacteristicsi,μ is a vector of individual level pre-migration characteris-
tics measured at departure μ. These include information on the economic situation, knowl-
edge of German, employment experience and backward reported measures of health and life
satisfaction before migration. It further includes a dummy variable taking the value one for
individuals who arrived alone in Germany, and zero otherwise. Finally, it includes a dummy
4The mental resilience scale is based on the procedure suggested by Jacobsen et al. [2017]. The scale is
based on the responses to four questions: "I try to think of how I can change difficult situations.";"No matter
what happens to me, I think I have my reactions under control."; "I think I can develop further if I deal with
difficult situations."; "I actively seek ways to balance out the losses that have affected my life." The response
scale ranges from 1 (disagree) to 7 (fully agree) and the resilience variable is the average of these responses.
The willingness to take risk variable is based on the question "How do you rate yourself personally? In
general, are you someone who is ready to take risks or do you try to avoid risks?" The response scale ranges
from 0 (not prepared to take risks at all) to 10 (Prepared to take risk).
5The residence of the spouse variable contains the following categories: Single; the spouse lives in the same
household, the spouse lives in a different household in Germany; the spouse resides abroad. The variable
related to the location of children contains the following categories: No children; all children live in the same
household; some children live in a different household.
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variable that takes the value 1 for individuals who had help from relatives or acquaintances
when moving to Germany.
The categorical variable Routei,μ indicates the migratory route taken as defined in section
3.1. ConflictIntensityi,μ measures the conflict intensity in the province of origin measured on
within-country conflict variation as explained in section 3.3. We include the conflict intensity
control in the baseline specification for two reasons: First, to account for previous findings
from psychological research showing that the individual-specific response of victimisation
depends on previous traumatic experiences [Yehuda, 2002, Breslau et al., 2008]. Second, to
add further precision to our estimates by accounting for selection into migration dynamics
at different levels of push factors at the origin [Aksoy and Poutvaara, 2019, Guichard, 2020].
AsylumStatusi,t is a time varying individual level characteristic, measured at the time of
the survey t. It is a fixed effects term with four categories: "Asylum granted", "Temporary
suspension of deportation", "Request to leave Germany" and "Decision pending". Only the
first two give refugees unrestricted access to the labour market in Germany, an institutional
feature we discuss in more detail in section 7.1.
MSM is the number of months a refugee spent in Germany and MSMsq is its squared
term. λ̂i,c,t is an estimated Heckman correction term if the outcome requires individuals to
be employed. αc captures country of origin fixed effects and δf reflects the German federal
state in which the refugee is residing at the time of the survey. We include the latter purely
to gain precision as refugees are not allowed to move freely and are assigned to a federal state
initially upon arrival [Aksoy et al., 2020]. Finally, εi,f,c,t is an error term. All standard errors
are obtained using delete-cluster jackknife methods due to the estimated (unknown) λ̂i if the
Heckman correction term is included.6 In the results section we refer to the set of controls
included in 1 as "Baseline controls".
Since the survey has a longitudinal dimension but our variable of interest is non-time-
varying, we estimate equation 1 in two ways. First, we estimate the model as a cross-section,
(i) only using the first observation available of each individual to study the effect of phys-
ical and financial victimisation on outcomes related to the (mental) health and well-being.
We use the first observation available to study these outcomes for two reasons. First, when
refugees were interviewed for the first time, they had spent only 19 months in Germany on
average. Thus, their mental well-being related outcomes can be expected to still be affected
by negative experiences during the journey to Germany or in their home country. Second,
the potential reverse causality problem of mental well-being and employment is minimized
[Brown et al., 2010, Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew, 2009]: Only 7% of our sample were
employed in the month prior to the interview when first surveyed. We then (ii) use the
last observation in the sample to study the effect of victimisation on economic integration
outcomes. At this point, individuals had spent an average of 31 months in the country and
21.8% were employed. While the average difference between the first and last observation
of each individual is therefore only 12 months -and thus concerns about potential sample
attrition due to selective return migration are minimized- the additional variation we gain in
our outcomes of interest is considerable.
6The industry standard here is to cluster-bootstrap standard errors. Due to the large amount of fixed
effects in the regression, bootstrapping becomes computationally impossible. Note that the delete-cluster
jackknife method produces slightly more conservative standard errors than bootstrapping [Efron, 1992]. The
estimated Heckman correction term is only included if statistically significant in the second stage.
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In a second step, we then also exploit the panel variation in the data and estimate a
(individual i) random effects model under the assumption that corr(εi,f,c,t, X) = 0.7 The
large number of time constant variables in the model - including the set of fixed effects
related to the time of migration and the origin of individuals - makes this key assumption
of a random effects model plausible in our setting [Wooldridge, 2010]. We note that, since
all asylum seekers naturally start their stay in Germany as economically inactive and the
likelihood of engaging in economic activity then increases over time, the panel estimates are
not directly comparable to the cross-sectional estimates based on only the final observation
of each individual.
4.2 Self-selection into migration to Germany at the origin
One of the key concerns in equation 1 as noted in section 3.4 is the bias the coefficients
γ1 and γ2 may pick up due to potential selection effects at the country of origin. In our
setting, selection at the origin relates to the concept of migration at different levels of ex-
pected victimisation risk. Since (past) cohort level victimisation rates can be understood as
a indirect measure of the (expected) journey risk, these findings require careful consideration
in our empirical strategy. We first note that limited evidence on the self-selection of forced
migrants at the origin at different expected journey risk levels has started to emerge in recent
academic literature. Aksoy and Poutvaara [2019] provide suggestive evidence that intended
destinations change when country-specific risk levels are altered through stricter migration
policies, with potential consequences for the cohort composition. The authors further show
that a higher conflict intensity at the origin leads to self-selected migration of more highly
educated asylum seekers, in particular among female migrants. It follows that at an increased
expected journey risk, which can also be understood as an increase in migration cost, self-
selection may become even more salient. Guichard [2020] further supports these findings.
The author shows that liquidity constraints drive a positive self-selection of asylum seekers
with respect to education for individuals from countries geographically distant to Germany,
such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.
Despite controlling for individuals’ willingness to take risk, the route travelled and conflict
intensity at origin around the time of migration in our baseline specification, the concerns
around self-selection into migration at the origin can most efficiently be tackled by the use
of a large set of fixed effects related to the country of origin and granular time of migration.
The detailed information on migrants’ journeys we obtain from our surveys allows us to
add interactive country-of-origin by year-month-of-migration fixed effects, κc,m to equation
1. We label this specification the Fixed Effects specification in our regression tables and, due
to its efficiency in eliminating self-selection dynamics, refer to it as our preferred specification
throughout this study.




Not all forcefully displaced migrants who decide to embark on the journey to Germany make
it to their preferred destination. If the selection of asylum seekers who eventually reach their
targeted destination is a random subset of those individuals that initially decided to migrate
there, selection during the journey would not be an empirical concern when studying the
effect of victimisation during the journey on integration outcomes as long as self-selection at
the origin is accounted for. If granular country of origin by time of departure fixed effects
are integrated as suggested in section 4.2, these would absorb random shocks to migration
cohorts: Even if specific cohorts then show relatively higher or lower victimisation rates,
the restriction to within-departure-cohort variation would prevent estimates on variables of
interest to pick up systematic bias.8
However, changes in the difficulty of the journey may potentially have non-random effects
on the arrival cohort composition, even when narrowly conditioning on the selection at the
origin at different points in time. We refer to this empirical issue as survivor bias. In the-
ory, such change in the composition of asylum seeker arrival cohorts can influence not only
the probability of victimisation but also their performance on the German labour market.
While we are again able to mitigate this concern by controlling for a large set of observable
characteristics discussed in section 3.4, unobservable compositional arrival cohort changes
may introduce bias in regressions of integration outcomes on individual level victimisation
experiences.
To the best of our knowledge, no previous research exists that could inform our empirical
strategy with regards to survivor bias and the extent to which it is a concern in our setting.
Empirically, we therefore address the issue of survivor bias by deploying a large set of dyadic
departure - arrival fixed effects in robustness tests. In addition to our preferred specifica-
tion suggested in section 4.2, we thus estimate a model that includes year-month of arrival
fixed effect, interacted with the year-month of departure and region of origin c,m,a, thereby
limiting the variation to even narrower categories within the region of origin, the month of
departure and the month of arrival. Due to the inevitable loss in degrees of freedom, we
include broader categories of migrants’ origin as shown in table 5 in these interactive fixed
effects, in addition to the country of origin fixed effects.
4.4 Further methods to address omitted variable bias
The rich set of background information available from the IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey data
allows us to control for pre-migration and selected post-migration characteristics, mitigating
potential unobserved variable bias. Deploying a large set of fixed effects as explained in 4.2
and 4.3 allows us to further capture institutional changes and cohort characteristics that
could otherwise bias the coefficients estimated on our variables of interest. A standard draw-
back of including a large set of fixed effects is a loss of statistical precision, which could lead
to discarding estimated effects that show no significance at conventional statistical levels.
8The effect would be visible in changes in the number of arrivals at any given time but since our focus is
on the comparisons at the individual level, this does not impact our estimation strategy.
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One way to more efficiently deal with the bias-variance trade-off while mitigating concerns
around theory-driven model specifications is the use of machine learning methods for data-
driven model selection. To test the sensitivity of our results to our modelling choice, we
therefore follow Belloni et al. [2014b] who develop a ’post-double selection’ (PDS) method
to estimate separate least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) regressions to
find predictors of the selection equation(s) and the outcome equation when many potential
controls are available. Their procedure thus allows us to consider all interactions and non-
linearities that are not considered in theory-driven specifications. Hence, instead of simply
including the control variables as in 1, the PDS approach considers all possible interactions
and non-linearities between the control variables and the country of origin and time of de-
parture fixed effects. Furthermore, we consider a set of additional control variables we did
not include previously due to their large number of missing values. These variables include:
The use of a smuggler, the log of the cost of the smuggler, the financing of the journey (e.g.,
sale of assets, borrowing, savings, among others), means of transportation used to reach
Germany (e.g., boat, car, foot, train, plain), self-reported reason for migrating (e.g., perse-
cution, discrimination, economic, among others), having stayed in another country for three
or more months before coming to Germany, and the log of the duration of the journey in days.
We apply the PDS methodology to our two variables of interest, PhysicalV ictim and
FinancialV ictim and proceed in a post-triple selection procedure: In a first step, we esti-
mate the final outcome equation using LASSO, excluding both the PhysicalV ictim and the
FinancialV ictim variable to obtain a first set of LASSO selected controls. In a second step,
we estimate the probability of physical and financial victimisation separately on the same set
of explanatory variables to obtain a second and third set of LASSO selected controls. Finally,
in a third step, we estimate a linear model similar to our baseline equation 1 that includes
the union of control variables selected by LASSO in the various steps. A more technical
explanation of the procedure is provided in appendix B.
Despite controlling for a wide range of relevant pre-migration and selected post-migration
variables as well as accounting for selection effects at various stages of the migratory journey,
omitted variable bias cannot be ruled out with absolute certainty. We therefore follow Oster
[2019] to test if controlling for observables, and the stability of the estimated coefficients on
our variables of interest when conditioning on these, mitigates bias arising from unobserv-
able factors. The technique suggested by Oster [2019] thus informs us about the salience of
omitted variable bias in our setting: It provides an estimate of the relative importance of
unobserved factors compared to those we do observe. We implement her methodology for our
preferred specification and first define a value for Rmax, the hypothetical R-squared value of
a fully specified model which includes all relevant control variables. Oster [2019] recommends
a value of Rmax = 1.3R̂, where R̂ is the R-squared value obtained from the estimated model;
we choose a slightly more conservative approach and set the Rmax to 1.5R̂. In a second
step, we then obtain the δ that informs us about the relative importance of omitted variables
compared to those variables we condition our estimates on: For example, a value of δ = 1
means that unobserved factors would have to be as important as those that are observed
for γ1 and γ2 of equation 1 to equal zero instead of the obtained estimate. We report the
estimated δ for our preferred specification in section 5.3.
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5 Results
In this section, we first discuss the main results which link victimisation on asylum seekers’
journey to Germany to the (mental) well-being outcomes and the economic integration at
both the external and the internal margin in section 5.1. In section 6, we conduct a wide
range of robustness tests. Finally, in section 7, we rule out various alternative explanations
to the suggested "loss of future directedness" channel.
Two tradeoffs need to be balanced in our regression analyses. First, the large amount
of fixed effects we introduce based on our analyses in sections 4.2 and 4.3 absorb a lot of
the variation in our outcomes. They effectively deal with bias due to selection effects but
lead to a loss in statistical precision. Second, some of the information on the arrival time
we require to construct the dyadic time of departure - month of arrival fixed effect is not
available for all individuals, decreasing the sample size. Our analyses throughout the paper
suggest that these tradeoffs are best balanced by adding fixed effects on the country of origin,
the time of departure and their interaction as suggested in section 4.2. We therefore refer
to this specification as our preferred specification. All other regressions discussed in the
previous section are nevertheless shown for completeness and robustness. We further show
the estimated coefficients for all additional control variables of our preferred specification in
appendix D.
5.1 Main results
We first turn to the results on the encompassing measure of mental well-being, life satisfaction,
in table 7.
Cross Section Panel Data
Life Satisfaction Benchmark Fixed effects Dyadic FE PDS Benchmark Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physical victim. -0.151 -0.166* -0.228* -0.214** -0.109 -0.162**
(0.0934) (0.0977) (0.129) (0.100) (0.0698) (0.0739)
Financial victim. -0.0984 -0.107 -0.193 -0.123 -0.0745 -0.102
(0.0902) (0.0966) (0.125) (0.0979) (0.0680) (0.0727)
Observations 2,261 2,261 1,711 2,112 4,864 4,864
R-squared 0.286 0.349 0.435
C. of origin x Y-M left origin FE No Yes Yes Some No Yes
R. origin x Y-M left origin x Y-M arrival FE No No Yes No No No
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Huber-White Standard Errors
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
The dependent variable captures self-reported life satisfaction on a scale from 1 to 10. Columns (1) to (4) use observations
corresponding to first interview conducted, 19 months after arrival on average. Panel data results are derived from a random
effects specification. The term FE indicates fixed effects. PDS refers to the post double-selection LASSO regressions. The term
Y-M left origin refers to the year-month of forceful displacement from the home country. Y-M arrival refers to the year-month
of arrival in Germany. C. of origin is the country of origin. Since the precise information on the year-month of arrival is not
available for all individuals, the dyadic FE regressions are estimated only on the subset of individuals where this information is
available. The PDS is estimated on the same sample as the Fixed Effects regression, but drops singleton observations.
Table 7: Life Satisfaction
Throughout specifications, the effect of physical victimisation on life satisfaction at the
time of arrival in Germany is negative. All estimated coefficients are statistically significant
at the 10% level or close to that threshold. In our preferred specification (column (2)),
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the magnitude of the coefficient is 0.166, which corresponds to a decrease of approximately
10% in the standard deviation of the measure. The estimated coefficients are stable across
specifications. Financial victimisation also shows a negative effect on life satisfaction across
specifications, but the estimated coefficients are smaller and less precisely estimated.
Turning to the self-reported health outcomes in table 8 confirms these results.
Health Satisfaction Cross Section Panel Data
Benchmark Fixed effects Dyadic FE PDS Benchmark Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physical victim. -0.199* -0.281** -0.222 -0.271** -0.175** -0.267***
(0.108) (0.116) (0.148) (0.114) (0.0846) (0.0908)
Financial victim. -0.212** -0.183 -0.311** -0.265** -0.157* -0.170*
(0.106) (0.114) (0.147) (0.113) (0.0815) (0.0875)
Observations 2,261 2,261 1,714 2,115 4,864 4,864
R-squared 0.267 0.328 0.414
C. of origin x Y-M left origin FE No Yes Yes Some No Yes
R. origin x Y-M left origin x Y-M arrival FE No No Yes No No No
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Huber–White standard errors
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
The dependent variable captures self-reported health on a scale from 1 to 10. Columns (1) to (4) use observations corresponding
to first interview conducted, 19 months after arrival on average. Panel data results are derived from a random effects specification.
The term FE indicates fixed effects. PDS refers to the post double-selection LASSO regressions. The term Y-M left origin refers
to the year-month of forceful displacement from the home country. Y-M arrival refers to the year-month of arrival in Germany.
C. of origin is the country of origin. Since the precise information on the year-month of arrival is not available for all individuals,
the dyadic FE regressions are estimated only on the subset of individuals where this information is available. The PDS is
estimated on the same sample as the Fixed Effects regression, but drops singleton observations.
Table 8: Health Satisfaction
In our preferred specification of column (2), physical victimisation decreases self-reported
health by 0.281 points (p<.05), again corresponding to approximately 10% in the standard
deviation of the measure. The estimated coefficient is stable across specifications. The nega-
tive effect of financial victimisation on self-assessed health is also visible across specifications,
albeit being of smaller magnitude in out preferred specification (column 2). In summary, two
main findings confirm the effect of victimisation on mental well-being and health established
in previous studies on the general (non-refugee) population [Mahuteau and Zhu, 2016, Dolan
et al., 2005, Johnston et al., 2018]. First, the event of victimisation has a negative effect on
both measures. Second, physical victimisation leaves a stronger effect on the overall well-
being of individuals and a marginally stronger effect on individuals’ self-assessed health. In
appendix A, we split the health measure into a physical and mental component and show
that the overall result is driven by a combination of both.
Table 9 then turns to the effect of physical and financial victimisation on the external
margin of economic activity, defined as those in the labour force or pursuing host-country
specific education.
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Labour force part. and Education Cross Section Panel Data
Benchmark Fixed effects Dyadic FE PDS Benchmark Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physical victim. 0.0378** 0.0382** 0.0362 0.0280 0.0314** 0.0373**
(0.0177) (0.0190) (0.0253) (0.0191) (0.0135) (0.0149)
Financial trauma -0.0126 -0.0108 0.0128 -0.00895 0.00518 -0.00668
(0.0175) (0.0184) (0.0244) (0.0185) (0.0135) (0.0145)
Observations 2,314 2,314 1,754 2,159 4,864 4,864
R-squared 0.239 0.306 0.386
C. of origin x Y-M left origin FE No Yes Yes Some No Yes
R. origin x Y-M left origin x Y-M arrival FE No No Yes No No No
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Huber–White standard errors
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
The dependent variable captures all individuals in the labour force or those pursuing host-country education or training.
Columns (1) to (4) use observations corresponding to the last interview conducted, 31 months after arrival on average. Panel
data results are derived from a random effects specification. The term FE indicates fixed effects. PDS refers to the post double-
selection LASSO regressions. The term Y-M left origin refers to the year-month of forceful displacement from the home country.
Y-M arrival refers to the year-month of arrival in Germany. C. of origin is the country of origin. Since the precise information
on the year-month of arrival is not available for all individuals, the dyadic FE regressions are estimated only on the subset of
individuals where this information is available. The PDS is estimated on the same number of observations as the benchmark
and the Fixed Effects regression, but drops singleton observations.
Table 9: Labour force participation and Education
We do not find a negative effect of victimisation during the journey on the external margin
of economic activity in the cross-sectional regressions (1) to (4) estimated on individuals who,
on average, had spent 31 months in Germany. In our preferred specification of column (2),
physical victimisation even has a small positive effect on being economically active (p<.05).
These results are further confirmed in the panel regressions (5) and (6). Since these panel
regressions include observations of the same individuals at an earlier point in time (when in-
dividuals had spent 19 months in Germany on average) and the cross-sectional regressions do
not include these, the stability of coefficients when comparing the cross-sectional and panel
results is noteworthy; it appears that the gap in economic activity between physically and
non-physically victimised already opens up at least 19 months after arrival. No such effect
can be found for the financially victimised.
To shed more light on the drivers of this finding, table 10 shows the results of the regres-
sions of labour force participation on our victimisation measures.
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Labour force participation Cross Section Panel Data
Benchmark Fixed effects Dyadic FE PDS Benchmark Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physical victim. 0.0544*** 0.0577*** 0.0525** 0.0447** 0.0405*** 0.0503***
(0.0180) (0.0193) (0.0258) (0.0191) (0.0137) (0.0150)
Financial victim. -0.0109 -0.0119 0.0161 -0.00465 0.00885 -0.00822
(0.0178) (0.0188) (0.0250) (0.0186) (0.0136) (0.0147)
Observations 2,314 2,314 1,754 2,159 4,864 4,864
R-squared 0.245 0.310 0.392
C. of origin x Y-M left origin FE No Yes Yes Some No Yes
R. origin x Y-M left origin x Y-M arrival FE No No Yes No No No
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Huber–White standard errors
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
The dependent variable is binary and takes the value 1 for individuals in the labour force. Columns (1) to (4) use observations
corresponding to the last interview conducted, 31 months after arrival on average. Panel data results are derived from a random
effects specification. The term FE indicates fixed effects. PDS refers to the post double-selection LASSO regressions. The term
Y-M left origin refers to the year-month of forceful displacement from the home country. Y-M arrival refers to the year-month
of arrival in Germany. C. of origin is the country of origin. Since the precise information on the year-month of arrival is not
available for all individuals, the dyadic FE regressions are estimated only on the subset of individuals where this information is
available. The PDS is estimated on the same sample as the Fixed Effects regression, but drops singleton observations.
Table 10: Labour force participation
The coefficients on labour force participation show a strong, precisely estimated positive
association of physical victimisation and joining the labour force across all specifications. In
our preferred specification of column (2), this effect is estimated at 5.8 percentage points
(p<.01). The effect remains visible and of only slightly smaller magnitude in the panel
specifications (5) and (6), suggesting that physically victimised individuals indeed join the
labour force sooner upon arrival. We do not find the same association between financial
victimisation and labour force participation, where the estimated effect is close to zero across
all specifications. Table 11 then shows the regression outcomes of the effect of victimisation
on pursuing host-country education and training, the second part of what we coined the
internal margin of economic activity.
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Education and training Cross Section Panel Data
Benchmark Fixed effects Dyadic FE PDS Benchmark Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physical victim. -0.0266** -0.0297** -0.0293* -0.0244* -0.00783 -0.0128
(0.0116) (0.0127) (0.0168) (0.0129) (0.00804) (0.00958)
Financial victim. 9.93e-05 -0.00098 0.00216 0.00464 -0.00674 -0.00328
(0.0117) (0.0124) (0.0156) (0.0126) (0.00794) (0.00911)
Observations 2,314 2,314 1,754 2,159 5,538 4,977
R-squared 0.115 0.209 0.301
C. of origin x Y-M left origin FE No Yes Yes Some No Yes
R. origin x Y-M left origin x Y-M arrival FE No No Yes No No No
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Huber–White standard errors
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
The dependent variable is binary and takes the value 1 for individuals pursuing host-country education or training. Columns
(1) to (4) use observations corresponding to the last interview conducted, 31 months after arrival on average. Panel data results
are derived from a random effects specification. The term FE indicates fixed effects. PDS refers to the post double-selection
LASSO regressions. The term Y-M left origin refers to the year-month of forceful displacement from the home country. Y-M
arrival refers to the year-month of arrival in Germany. C. of origin is the country of origin. Since the precise information on
the year-month of arrival is not available for all individuals, the dyadic FE regressions are estimated only on the subset of
individuals where this information is available. The PDS is estimated on the same sample as the Fixed Effects regression, but
drops singleton observations.
Table 11: Education and training
By design, the results complement those of tables 9 and 10. Physical victimisation signif-
icantly decreases the propensity to pursue host-country specific education or training across
all specifications. In our preferred specification of column (2), this negative effect reaches 2.97
percentage points, a very sizeable decrease considering that the total share of refugees in our
sample pursuing education or training stands at 8.1 percentage points 31 months after arrival
(see table 3). Three points are further noteworthy: First, the panel regressions of column
(5) and (6) suggest that this effect only becomes visible after some time in the country. The
estimated coefficients are smaller in magnitude and no longer distinguishable from zero when
including observations on the same individuals closer to arrival. Second, the lower share of
physically victimised refugees in education and training does not entirely close the gap to the
higher labour force participation of the same group shown in table 10. In combination, these
two observations suggest that the barriers to pursuing host-country education are higher and
education opportunities open to refugees require more time to search for than joining the
labour force. Finally, the coefficients estimated on the financial victimisation indicator again
show no effects across all specifications.
In summary, our findings indicate that the physical victimisation event i) increases the
propensity to join the labour force early on and ii) decreases the propensity to pursue host-
country education and training. The results in tables 9, 10 and 11 thus suggest that the
act of physical victimisation leads to a distortion in the timing of labour force entry, which
appears to dominate the more general well-being related effects that would likely lead to
lower economic activity rates. We interpret these findings as supportive of the "loss of future
directedness" hypothesis.
In section 5.2, we further put this hypothesis to the test by explicitly i) considering
whether the higher labour force participation rates indeed result in higher employment rates,
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ii) analysing the type of employment victimised individuals engage in vis-à-vis the non-
victimised and iii) shedding more light on the timing of first employment when comparing
the different groups.
5.2 Employment outcomes
Our findings shown in section 5.1 strongly support the idea that the act of physical vic-
timisation reduces future-oriented thinking among the affected. This section more explicitly
considers the consequences of an early labour force entry: If the "loss of future directedness"
was indeed a relatively stronger driving force within the group of the physically victimised,
we would expect a lower reservation wage and thus a relatively higher take-up of readily avail-
able low-income employment among those who experienced physical victimisation events on
their journey to Germany.
Table 12 shows regression results with different types of employment rates as the de-
pendent variable for the full sample of refugees. We focus on the whole population as the
underlying population - rather than only those in the labour force - to make these regressions
directly comparable to those in table 10. We nevertheless report the same employment rates
for only those in the labour force in appendix C. We further only report results for our
preferred specification in both the cross-section and the panel in all subsequent analyses.
Employment Any Employment Full-Time Part-Time or marginal Log of Income
Cross S. Panel D. Cross S. Panel D. Cross S. Panel D. Cross S. Panel D.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Physical victim. 0.0438** 0.0326** 0.0136 0.00931 0.0302** 0.0236** -0.229 -0.128
((0.0189) (0.0134) (0.0148) (0.0104) (0.0147) (0.0106) (0.146) (0.108)
Financial victim. 00.0037 0.0010 0.0062 0.0039 -0.0025 -0.0028 0.0150 -0.00968
(0.0185) (0.0128) (0.0145) (0.00984) (0.0142) (0.0100) (0.143) (0.107)
Observations 2,314 4,864 2,314 4,864 2,314 4,864 408 750
R-squared 0.258 0.239 0.152 0.372
C. of origin x Y-M left origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Huber–White standard errors
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
The dependent variable is binary and takes the value 1 for employed individuals, with regressions showing employment outcomes
for any employment ((1) and (2)), full-time employment ((3) and (4)) and part-time or marginal employment ((5) and (6)). All
samples use observations corresponding to the last interview conducted, 31 months after arrival on average; Columns (7) and
(8) are estimated on the sample of individuals employed after 31 months. Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) show the results of a
cross-sectional regression on the last interview conducted. Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) are derived from a random effects panel
specification. The term FE indicates fixed effects. The term Y-M left origin refers to the year-month of forceful displacement
from the home country.
Table 12: Employment
The results in table 12 indeed suggest that the higher labour force participation among
physically victimised is driven by an increased uptake in part-time and marginal employment
vis-à-vis the non-victimised. Column (1) reports the excess employment rate of physically
victimised refugees for the last observation available of each individual, at an average duration
of stay in Germany of 31 months. It is 4.4 percentage points higher than the employment rate
among the non-victimised at that point. The panel regression of column (2) - which again
includes earlier observations of the same individuals when employment rates were closer to
zero and estimates the average employment gap over time - confirms this result. In line with
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the "loss of future directedness" hypothesis, early employment uptake is characterised by a
poor quality of jobs available to refugees. More than two thirds of the excess employment
rates among the physically victimised is explained by employment in part-time and marginal
jobs (columns (5) and (6)). Less than one third of the effect is explained by full-time employ-
ment, a magnitude that is no longer statistically distinguishable from zero at conventional
levels (columns (3) and (4)). Column (7), estimated only on the sample of employed refugees,
provides suggestive evidence that 31 months after arrival, these differences already result in
a 22% wage gap between the non-physically-victimised and the physically victimised. We
note that this difference is likely to increase in the future when the non-physically-victimised
complete their training and education, an idea further supported by the slightly smaller coef-
ficient estimated in the panel regression of column (8) where earlier observations are included
in the sample.
We have so far not conclusively addressed the question of the timing of employment
uptake of victimised individuals compared to the non-victimised: While comparing the cross-
sectional (column 1) results, which only contain the last observation of each individual, to
the panel results (column 2) of table 12 strongly suggests that joining the labour force early
allows for faster access to part-time and marginal employment, the larger sample size in
the panel regressions could also simply add statistical precision to the estimates. To shed
more light on the timing of first employment in Germany, we turn to the linked employment
biography data, which contains information on the date of first employment. Figure 1 shows
the unconditional Kaplan-Meier curve of time to first employment, where failure is defined as
obtaining employment and the x-axis shows the number of month since arrival in Germany.
The analysis is based on a subsample of 1,625 survey respondents who gave their consent to be
linked to administrative employment records. Of these individuals, 751 obtained employment
at some point over the observation period; we note that this share is larger than the 21.8%
in our cross-sectional regressions. The difference is explained by the IEB data extending
beyond the last available survey wave. The cross-sectional regressions we presented so far
thus correspond to the 31-months-point on the x-axis.
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Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier estimates of time to first employment
The left hand-side graph in figure 1 shows that, compared to the non-victimised refugees,
physically victimised refugees obtain employment faster. The gap starts to open around
18 months after arrival, a dynamic we explicitly analyse further in section 7.1. The right
hand-side graph shows the same comparison for the financially victimised, where we again









Table 13: Cox proportional hazard model
The parameter estimates show the increase in the expected log of the relative hazard
for the physical victimisation and financial victimisation groups vis-à-vis the non-victimised.
Exponentiating the parameter estimates shows that the expected hazard, equal to finding
employment, is 1.23 times higher for the physically victimised than the non-victimised on
average. Although not causal, these results lend further support to the interpretation that
physical victimisation events lead to a more present-oriented mindset that attaches more
value to immediate payoffs.
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We demonstrated in table 12 that early employment uptake is generally characterised by
part-time and marginal employment (columns 5 and 6). The IEB contains further information
on the level of task requirement for a subset of 569 of the 751 employed individuals in our
sample, shown in table 14.
No F.V. F.V. No P.V. P.V. Total
% Obs % Obs % Obs % Obs % Obs
1 Unskilled/semi-skilled task 34.4 116 33.6 78 30.9 111 39.5 83 34.1 194
2 Skilled task 46.9 158 45.3 105 47.4 170 44.3 93 46.2 263
3 Complex task 4.7 16 3.9 9 5.6 20 2.4 5 4.4 25
4 Highly complex task 13.9 47 17.2 40 16.2 58 13.8 29 15.3 87
F.V. refers to financial victimization and P.V. to physical victimization
Table 14: Level of job requirement
The tabulation shows that physically victimized individuals seem to take up jobs with
unskilled or semi-skilled task requirements at a higher frequency. Row 1 of table 14 shows
that the excess share of physically victimised vis-à-vis the non-physically-victimised stands at
8.6 percentage points; on the other hand, the employed share of physically victimised in the
skilled task, complex and highly complex task categories is relatively smaller. We note two
limitations of this analyses. First, the sample size in most categories is small and should be
interpreted with care. Second, since employment is measured at an early stage after arrival, it
is likely that the returns to host-country education are not yet fully captured and will pay off
at a later stage. Nevertheless, the analysis of skill-requirements for the jobs performed lends
further support to the idea that faster employment uptake among the physically victimised
is characterised by low-skill employment.
5.3 Testing for the significance of unobserved confounding variables
The key identifying assumption we make in this study is that once we condition on the
geography and the timing of migration, and thus self-selection into migration at different
expected victimisation levels, the coefficients we obtain on the victimisation variables them-
selves are unbiased. To strengthen that case, our main regressions further control for a wide
range of individual level (pre-migration) socio-economic characteristics to mitigate the risk
of omitted variable bias. A further test to assess the likelihood of unobserved confounders as
the driving force behind our results was developed by Oster [2019]. In this section, we follow
her methodology as laid out in 4.4 and estimate how large the effect of unobserved variables
would have to be to obtain zero-coefficients on the victimisation indicators in our preferred
specification.
Table 15 shows the estimated δ values corresponding to the results of our preferred spec-
ification in tables 7 (column (2)), 9 (column (2)), 10 (column (2)), 11 (column (2)) and 12
































































































































































































































































































We first turn to the test results obtained on physical victimisation events. All obtained
δ values clearly indicate that the explanatory power of omitted variables would have to be
very large compared to those variables included in the model for the estimated coefficients
on physical victimisation to be zero. For example, in table 11, column (2), we estimate
that refugees who were physically victimised on their journey to Germany were 3 percentage
points less likely to be in education or training 31 months after arrival compared to the non-
physically victimised. For the obtained coefficients to be zero instead, unobserved variables
would have to be 36.5 times larger than those control variables included in the model. The
only value below the δ = 1 threshold recommended by Oster [2019] is the obtained coefficient
obtained on full-time employment in table 12, column (3). However, the coefficient is not
statistically significant from zero at any conventional level in our estimation and the result is
therefore unsurprising. In sum, all test results suggest that the estimated effect of physical
victimisation on integration outcomes are highly robust to omitted variable bias.
Unsurprisingly, almost all obtained δ values on the estimated financial victimisation co-
efficients lie below the δ = 1 threshold: None of them are significantly different from zero
in our main regressions at any conventional level, suggesting no effect of financial victimisa-
tion events during the flight to Germany on individuals’ well-being and economic integration
outcomes.
6 Robustness
In this section, we show the results using alternative ways of aggregating the victimization
experiences in subsection 6.1 and for specific types of victimisation events in subsection 6.2.
We then present a range of split-sample regressions to show that the main results are not
driven by any particular subsample in the data. Subsection 6.3 shows the main results split
by major countries of origin, subsection 6.4 splits the sample by gender„ and subsection 6.5
zooms in on different arrival cohorts.
6.1 Effects by sum of physical victimisation and sum of financial
victimisation events
We start by showing that our results are robust to different specifications of the physical and
financial victimization. In particular, one of our modelling choices in the analyses so far has
been to code the victimisation events as binary indicators. For our integration outcomes,
this choice implicitly assumes that once individuals had to endure a physical or financial vic-
timisation event, additional victimisation events do not alter their well-being and behaviour
further. In this subsection, we relax this assumption and explicitly consider the precise num-
ber of victimization events individuals endured. Table 16 summarises the number of physical
(financial) victimisation events by the share of individuals who endured them. The acronym
P.V.E. denotes physical victimisation events(s) and F.V.E. financial victimisation events(s).
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Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Physical victimisation
None 0.641 0.48
1 P.V.E 0.249 0.433
2 P.V.E 0.091 0.288
3 P.V.E 0.018 0.134
4 P.V.E 0.001 0.029
Financial victimisation
None 0.61 0.488
1 F.V.E 0.24 0.427
2 F.V.E 0.114 0.318
3 F.V.E 0.035 0.185
N 2314
Table 16: Summary statistics - number of physical and financial victimisation events
In table 17 we first turn to the regression results of our preferred specification using a
linear and a squared measure of the number of physical victimization events, that ranges
from zero to a maximum of four, and of the number of financial victimization events, that
ranges from zero to a maximum of three.
LFP & Educ. LFP Educ. All employ. FT employ. Part-Time or marginal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of physical victim. 0.0221 0.0511* -0.0427** 0.0598** 0.00665 0.0532**
(0.0280) (0.0287) (0.0192) (0.0293) (0.0232) (0.0230)
Number of physical victim. squared 0.00276 -0.00708 0.0133 -0.0195 0.00263 -0.0221**
(0.0112) (0.0117) (0.00830) (0.0128) (0.0105) (0.0101)
Number financial of victim -0.000405 -0.00836 0.00648 0.0265 0.0256 0.000962
(0.0282) (0.0288) (0.0197) (0.0291) (0.0230) (0.0230)
Number financial of victim. squared -0.00543 -0.000620 -0.00560 -0.0122 -0.0113 -0.000872
(0.0116) (0.0118) (0.00823) (0.0121) (0.00967) (0.00971)
Observations 2,314 2,314 2,314 2,314 2,314 2,314
R-squared 0.306 0.310 0.210 0.258 0.240 0.153
C. of origin x Y-M left origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Huber–White standard errors
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
The dependent variable is binary and takes the value 1 for individuals in employment/labour force participation/education,
and zero otherwise. FT means full-time. Results are only shown for our preferred specification, corresponding to column (2) in
the main result tables.
Table 17: Number of victimization experiences (continuous)
The results confirm our main results but their interpretation changes. Column (2) now
shows that any additional physical victimisation event increases the probability of joining the
labour force by 5.1 percentage points, an effect again driven by the take up of marginal and
part-time employment (column 6) and at the cost of not pursuing host-country education
(column 3). We also note that the estimated coefficients on the squared number of victim-
isation events are close to zero and not statistically significant at any conventional level.
Adding polynomials that allow for a more flexible curvilinear relation between victimisation
events and integration outcomes are therefore likely to be unnecessary. Similar to our main
results, we find no effect of financial victimisation events on economic integration outcomes
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in Germany.
In table 18 we then turn to the results where the different number of victimisation events
enter as categorical variables, against the base category of zero victimisation events.
LFP & Educ. LFP Educ. All employ. FT employ. Part-Time or marginal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 P.V.E. 0.0443** 0.0623*** -0.0230* 0.0558*** 0.0111 0.0446***
(0.0209) (0.0212) (0.0138) (0.0210) (0.0163) (0.0165)
2 or more P.V.E. 0.0335 0.0510* -0.0360* 0.00823 0.0179 -0.00963
(0.0283) (0.0285) (0.0200) (0.0308) (0.0252) (0.0227)
1 F.V.E. 0.000862 -0.00544 0.0112 0.00622 0.00313 0.00309
(0.0204) (0.0210) (0.0146) (0.0212) (0.0166) (0.0165)
2 or more F.V.E. -0.0316 -0.0226 -0.0223 0.00658 0.0110 -0.00439
(0.0259) (0.0262) (0.0162) (0.0270) (0.0220) (0.0206)
Observations 2,314 2,314 2,314 2,314 2,314 2,314
R-squared 0.307 0.310 0.210 0.259 0.239 0.155
C. of origin x Y-M left origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Huber–White standard errors
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
The dependent variable is binary and takes the value 1 for individuals in employment/labour force participation/education,
zero otherwise. FT means full-time. Results are only shown for our preferred specification, corresponding to column (2) in the
main result tables.
Table 18: Number of victimization experiences (discrete)
The results show that the main results are driven by individuals in both categories, those
that experienced one and those that experienced multiple victimisation events, with no clear
pattern emerging. The less precisely estimated coefficients on the multiple victimisation event
category are likely a result of the smaller number of observations in this group. Overall, we
interpret the results of these alternative victimisation specifications as a confirmation of our
main results and the modelling choice of victimisation as a binary indicator.
6.2 Effects by victimisation event
Our analyses so far did not differentiate between different types of victimisation events in-
dividuals endured on their flight to Germany beyond a distinction between physical and
financial harm. We therefore implicitly assumed that all physical and financial victimisation
events have a similar effect on economic integration outcomes. In this subsection, we relax
this specification and break down the binary physical and financial victimisation indicators
into their respective events. Table 19 shows the regression results for the same economic
integration measures as in all previous analyses, based on our preferred specification.
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LFP & Educ. LFP Educ. All employ. FT employ. Part-Time or marginal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp. robbery -0.0251 -0.0112 -0.0299* 0.0180 -0.00383 0.0219
(0.0274) (0.0275) (0.0177) (0.0291) (0.0226) (0.0237)
Exp. extortion -0.0231 -0.0130 0.00882 -0.0359 -0.0385* -0.0137
(0.0249) (0.0253) (0.0175) (0.0254) (0.0202) (0.0192)
Exp. fraud -0.00174 -0.0104 0.0000 0.0182 0.0263 -0.00809
(0.0202) (0.0206) (0.0143) (0.0249) (0.0202) (0.0192)
Exp. sexual harass. 0.0180 0.0467 0.00612 0.164** 0.0110 0.153**
(0.0765) (0.0777) (0.0507) (0.0701) (0.0471) (0.0633)
Exp. shipwreck 0.00829 0.0231 -0.0123 -0.0131 -0.00280 -0.0103
(0.0254) (0.0256) (0.0157) (0.0255) (0.0191) (0.0196)
Exp. physical attack 0.0611** 0.0670*** -0.0346** 0.0488 0.0399* 0.0089
(0.0248) (0.0250) (0.0177) (0.0302) (0.0240) (0.0237)
Exp. incarceration 0.0205 0.0252 -0.00646 0.0117 0.00396 0.0077
(0.0222) (0.0226) (0.0154) (0.0231) (0.0187) (0.0177)
Observations 2,314 2,314 2,314 2,314 2,314 2,314
R-squared 0.307 0.310 0.210 0.261 0.242 0.155
C. of origin x Y-M left origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Huber–White standard errors
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
The dependent variable is binary and takes the value 1 for individuals in employment/labour force participation/education,
zero otherwise. FT means full-time. Results are only shown for our preferred specification, corresponding to column (2) in the
main result tables.
Table 19: Breakdown by type of victimisation event
We start by noting that the lack of an association between financial victimisation and our
economic integration outcome measures is generally not driven by opposing signs of financial
victimisation events that otherwise affect the outcome. Two individually estimated coeffi-
cients among the financial victimisation events show an association with outcome measures
that is significant at the 10% statistical level. Having experienced robbery during the journey
shows a negative association with pursuing host-country education (column 3), while individ-
uals who experienced extortion are moderately less likely to be full-time employed (column
6). Absent other clear patterns, a suggestive explanation for these findings is that, unlikely
fraud, robbery and extortion may be more likely to occur concomitant with physical victim-
isation events. However, we also note that statistical significance at the 10% level of two out
of 18 coefficients estimated is well within the expected range of randomly drawn coefficients
and should therefore be interpreted with care. On the other hand, the results obtained on the
physical victimisation events show a much clearer pattern. Column (2) shows that events of
sexual harassment, shipwreck, physical attacks and incarceration are all positively linked to
labour force participation, while column (3), with the exception of sexual harassment, shows
a negative association of these events with pursuing host-country education. We further note
that while the estimated coefficients on the different physical victimisation events in table 19
are generally of the same sign, having experienced physical attacks has the strongest effect
on economic integration outcomes, both in magnitude and statistical precision. The finding
is well in line with the victimisation literature that finds physical abuse to be the strongest
predictor of mental well-being [Dolan et al., 2005, Mahuteau and Zhu, 2016, Johnston et al.,
2018]. A further suggestive explanation is that physical abuse directly carried out by agents
along the migration route leaves larger mental scars on victims than second-order victimisa-
tion events such as shipwreck and short-term incarceration that are only indirectly caused
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by perpetrators.
6.3 Heterogeneous effects by major countries of origin
One of the main concerns using sensitive survey data on victimisation is the reliability of
responses [Krumpal, 2013]. In our setting, a relevant problem is the so-called "desirability
bias": Respondents could be inclined to over-report victimisation if they think vulnerabil-
ity is expected of them by the host community. This general problem of sensitive survey
questions is exacerbated by the uncertain legal status many of the surveyed refugees faced
at the time of their first interview in 2016 when about 36 percent of the respondents were
still awaiting their asylum decision. Two institutional features alleviate this concern. First,
interviewers make it clear to all respondents that the survey is conducted independent of
the asylum procedure itself and information provided in the survey cannot be used against
surveyees. Second, asylum is granted based on individuals’ safety in their home country,
rather than during their journey. Nevertheless, some respondents may still give answers they
deem favourable with regards to their chances of receiving protection. If such misreporting
was systematically correlated with future individual labour market outcomes, this could bias
the estimated coefficients. We address the issue by splitting up our our analysis by country
of origin, exploiting the fact that Syrians who were displaced from Syria between 2014 and
2016 are particularly unlikely to give socially desired survey responses. Due to the war in
Syria that spread across the entire country, the rate of Syrians who were granted protection
in Germany was extremely high and stood at 97 percent over our observation period. In
fact, the German government acknowledged the general need for protection of displaced Syr-
ians and introduced so-called simplified asylum procedures for Syrians already in November
2014. These allowed Syrian asylum seekers to get their asylum status granted by simply filling
in a ten-page questionnaire and by proving that they were actually from Syria [Grote, 2018]. 9
Tables 20 show the results for the countries of origin where more than 100 respondents
are available, grouping Iraq and Iran as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan.
9While at the time of the policy introduction there was public fear of abuse of these simplified procedures,
a later assessment by the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees found that 99.6 percent of
applicants had filled in the questionnaires truthfully and were indeed Syrian Nationals [German Federal
Office for Migration and Refugees, 2020].
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LFP Education
Syrian Iraq & Iran Afghanistan & Pakistan Syrian Iraq & Iran Afghanistan & Pakistan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physical victim. 0.0551** 0.0578 0.0623 -0.0190 -0.0124 -0.130***
(0.0228) (0.0503) (0.0745) (0.0156) (0.0267) (0.0488)
Financial victim. -0.0170 0.0708 0.0432 -0.00940 0.0382 -0.00181
(0.0219) (0.0526) (0.0685) (0.0153) (0.0236) (0.0378)
Observations 1,543 375 203 1,543 375 203
R-squared 0.272 0.378 0.588 0.182 0.423 0.500
C. of origin x Y-M left origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FT employed Part-Time or marginal
Syrian Iraq & Iran Afghanistan & Pakistan Syrian Iraq & Iran Afghanistan & Pakistan
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Physical victim. 0.00303 0.0586 -0.0761 0.0319* 0.0481 -0.00439
(0.0180) (0.0386) (0.0662) (0.0178) (0.0344) (0.0614)
Financial victim. 0.0115 0.00810 0.0388 -0.0127 0.0357 0.0741
(0.0172) (0.0374) (0.0522) (0.0173) (0.0327) (0.0525)
Observations 1,543 375 203 1,543 375 203
R-squared 0.162 0.286 0.504 0.089 0.251 0.509
C. of origin x Y-M left origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Huber–White standard errors
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
The dependent variable is binary and takes the value 1 for individuals in the labour force/education, zero otherwise. Results
are only shown for our preferred specification, corresponding to column (2) in the main result tables.
Table 20: Outcomes by main country of origin
We conclude that the main results of physical victimisation are not driven by individuals of
any country of origin in particular. Columns (1), (2) and (3) show that physically victimised
individuals are more likely to join the labour force rather than pursuing host-country specific
education (columns 4, 5 and 6), regardless of their origin. We note that the magnitude of
effects is largest for migrants originating from Afghanistan and Pakistan (columns 3 and 6).
A likely explanation can be found in subsection 6.2: In our sample, Afghans and Pakistanis
were significantly more likely to experience physical abuse (28%) than Syrians (10%) and
individuals originating from Iraq or Iran (14%). The association of physical victimisation
with part-time employment (column 11, 12 and 13) on the other hand is driven primarily
by Syrians, both in magnitude and statistical precision. We note that Syrians constitute by
far the largest group and the more precisely estimated results are therefore not unexpected.
Financial victimisation shows no association with economic integration measures across the
different estimations, adding further robustness to our main results.
6.4 Heterogeneous effects by gender
The asylum seekers entering into Germany between 2013 and 2017 mainly originated from
countries where women have culturally different economic roles than men [Fuchs et al., 2020].
If individuals regress to a present-oriented mindset in response to victimisation experiences,
negative events occurring during the flight to Germany could have effects on the economic
integration of refugees that differ between men and women. For example, if joining the labour
force represents a bigger step for women than men, potentially traumatic events and their
negative effect on mental well-being may discourage women relatively more from becoming
economically active. Table 21 therefore shows the main results of our preferred specification
by gender.
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LFP Education FT employ. Part-Time or marginal
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Physical victim. 0.0422** 0.0641 -0.0195 -0.0351* 0.0268 -0.00236 0.0225 0.0439**
(0.0210) (0.0447) (0.0171) (0.0183) (0.0223) (0.00941) (0.0204) (0.0222)
Financial victim. -0.00164 0.0184 -0.000105 -0.00479 0.00727 0.0136 0.00103 -0.00224
(0.0206) (0.0426) (0.0168) (0.0194) (0.0215) (0.0110) (0.0192) (0.0235)
Observations 1,472 734 1,472 734 1,472 734 1,472 734
R-squared 0.261 0.319 0.227 0.300 0.244 0.249 0.171 0.185
C. of origin x Y-M left origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Huber–White standard errors
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
The dependent variable is binary and takes the value 1 for individuals in the labour force/education/employment, zero otherwise.
Results are only shown for our preferred specification, corresponding to column (2) in the main result tables.
Table 21: Outcomes by Gender
The results indicate that both men and women are affected very similarly by victimisation
events. While noting that the smaller samples lead to a loss in statistical precision, the
estimated coefficients on physical victimisation in columns (2) and (4) indicate that physical
victimisation events affect women’s decision to join the labour force instead of pursuing host-
country education at an even larger magnitude than men’s (column 1 and 3). For both men
and women, the higher probability to join the labour force following physical victimisation
only increases the uptake of part-time employment (columns 7 and 8). Financial victimisation
shows no association with economic integration outcomes when splitting the sample between
men and women. We therefore conclude that our main results are not driven by any gender
in particular.
6.5 Heterogeneous effects by arrival cohort
One of the main challenges in the setting at hand is to separate selection effects at different
expected victimisation (and thus, risk) levels from individual level effects of victimisation. In
our empirical strategy laid out in section 4, we discuss our approach in detail and argue that
narrowly defined fixed effects relating to both the time and geography of migration (and their
interaction) are necessary to mitigate the issue. A related issue is that asylum seeker arrival
cohorts may differ significantly in their composition over time for entirely exogenous reasons:
Displacement happens in different geographical regions at different points in time, leading
to heterogeneous arrival cohorts that reach their destination when labour market conditions
are potentially more or less favourable to integration. If, for example, arrival cohorts differ
along their educational attainment and also face a different victimisation risk, this could
provide an explanation for between-cohort differences in labour market outcomes. While our
empirical specification discussed in section 4.3 covers this issue by including dyadic fixed
effects that limit variation to within-cohorts, it is worth exploring if our results are driven by
any arrival cohort specifically. To do so, we split the sample by the different arrival cohorts.
The regression results for three different cohorts arriving in Germany in 2013-2014, 2015 and
2016-2017 are shown in table 22.
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LFP Education
2013-2014 2015 2016-2017 2013-2014 2015 2016-2017
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physical trauma 0.0338 0.0487** 0.157** -0.0295 -0.0318** -0.0196
(0.0567) (0.0229) (0.0751) (0.0419) (0.0152) (0.0458)
Financial trauma -0.0515 0.00365 0.0375 0.000815 0.0110 -0.0440
(0.0507) (0.0226) (0.0722) (0.0453) (0.0145) (0.0468)
Observations 408 1,527 292 408 1,527 292
R-squared 0.526 0.299 0.463 0.425 0.190 0.321
C. of origin x Y-M left origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FT employ. Part-Time or marginal
2013-2014 2015 2016-2017 2013-2014 2015 2016-2017
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Physical victim. -0.0135 0.0003 0.0202 0.0510 0.0274 0.0339
(0.0536) (0.0176) (0.0378) (0.0666) (0.0172) (0.0547)
Financial victim. -0.0557 0.0276 0.0345 -0.0871 -0.0118 0.107*
(0.0497) (0.0179) (0.0294) (0.0576) (0.0164) (0.0552)
Observations 408 1,527 292 408 1,527 292
R-squared 0.434 0.237 0.265 0.490 0.136 0.366
C. of origin x Y-M left origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Huber–White standard errors
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
The dependent variable is binary and takes the value 1 for individuals in the labour force/education, zero otherwise. Results
are only shown for our preferred specification, corresponding to column (2) in the main result tables.
Table 22: Outcomes by Cohort
No clear pattern emerges when comparing the effect of physical victimisation events on
economic outcomes across arrival cohort. All estimated coefficients are of the expected sign.
We note that the 2015 cohort is far larger than the 2013-2014 cohort and the 2016-2017,
which accurately reflects the magnitude of asylum seeker inflows into Germany but is also
likely to explain the higher statistical precision on estimates related to the cohort (columns
2, 5 and 11). We therefore conclude that differences in arrival cohorts are unlikely to provide
an explanation for the effect of physical victimisation on refugees’ decision to invest into
host-country education or take up employment shortly after arrival.
7 Testing alternative mechanisms
One of the limitations of the "loss of future directedness" channel (or higher time discounting
rates) we propose as an explanation to our findings is that it is not easily distinguishable from
more general mental well-being effects. In other words, since mental health likely affects both
the external and the internal margin of economic activity, our results imply that the effect
on the internal margin dominates. Since we cannot test the "loss of future directedness"
directly, we go through alternative mechanisms that could plausibly explain our findings as
laid out in section 2.
We first zoom into the asylum procedure more closely in section 7.1 to analyse if our
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results could be mechanically driven by design features of the German asylum system. In
7.2, we then test if disproportional financial hardship among the physically victimised could
explain their faster uptake of low-income employment. Finally, in section 7.3, we test if
the negative experience during the journey could have an off-putting effect on victimised
individuals’ intention to stay in Germany shortly after arrival, which could in turn make the
investment into host-country specific human capital less attractive. In this section we show
that none of this mechanisms is likely to be driving our findings.
7.1 Institutional design: Asylum procedures
If victimised individuals received asylum faster since they have a more genuine case for
protection and therefore got access to the labour market faster upon arrival, this would
mechanically link victimisation to a faster labour market integration and could potentially
explain our main results. If the differences in the length of asylum procedures are very large,
this could even lead to a scarring effect, permanently deterring those stuck in the procedure
from labour market participation beyond the duration of the procedure itself [Hainmueller
et al., 2016]. A similar reasoning holds for the general case for asylum: If victimised indi-
viduals have a more legitimate claim for protection, their refugee status could allow them to
integrate into the labour market in larger numbers by design.10
To test this, we compare the outcome and the length of asylum procedures between vic-
timised and non-victimised individuals explicitly in table 23. There is no visible difference
between financially victimised individuals and those that were not victimised with regard to
the share that ultimately received protection status. Among the physically victimised, the
share was even slightly lower (69.4 percent) than among the non-victimised (75.4 percent).
We also note that the average unconditional duration of the asylum procedure is slightly
longer among both physically and financially victimised individuals compared to those who
did not experience victimisation during their journey.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Non-victimised
Asylum granted 0.754 0.431 0 1 1258
Length of asylum procedure in months 7.552 6.359 0 47 841
Physically victimised
Asylum granted 0.694 0.461 0 1 994
Length of asylum procedure in months 7.782 6.372 0 44 595
Financially victimised
Asylum granted 0.734 0.442 0 1 1026
Length of asylum procedure in months 7.473 6.151 0 44 673
Note: The variable measuring the length of the asylum procedure is not available for all asylum seekers.
Our tests that the variable is not systematically missing are available upon request.
Table 23: Summary statistics asylum pocedure
The German asylum system has a second key institutional feature that could encourage
10Although this point is partially addressed by the inclusion of a categorical variables capturing each
individual’s asylum status in our main specification.
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fast employment among specific segments of the asylum seeking population. Despite options
being very limited in scope, obtaining employment before asylum can improve the chances
of receiving a temporary protection status ("Duldung") in Germany [Brücker et al., 2019].
Finding employment upon arrival is therefore particularly incentivised for migrants with a low
probability of receiving full protection status since employment disproportionally increases
the probability of being allowed to stay in Germany for these individuals. If some individuals’
migration decision is motivated by economic reasons in addition to humanitarian reasons and
these individuals take higher risks during their journey, these asylum seekers could then also
be more motivated to increase their chances of being granted a permission to stay by taking
up employment before the end of their asylum procedure.
We test this possibility on the IEB employment biography data by mapping employment
rates between victimised and non-victimised refugees for a) the time of arrival and the point
in time when asylum was granted and b) after asylum was granted. The exercise of a pre-
trend and post-trend comparison allows us to test at what point employment rates start to
diverge.
Figure 2: Pre- and post-protection trends in employment
Figure 2 shows the result of this exercise, with the x-axis starting at the time of arrival
and t = 0 indicating the month in which asylum was granted. We do not find any evidence
that employment rates diverge already prior to the end of the asylum procedure.
7.2 Behavioural changes due to financial difficulties
Smugglers have been documented to be responsible for abuse of asylum seekers during their
journey and often charge large amounts for their services Albahari [2018]. We document
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this difference for a subset of our sample in table 5: On average, physically and financially
victimised asylum seeker paid 1420 Euro and 1802 Euro more to escape agents than non-
victimised migrants. If this means that victimised migrants relied more heavily on the services
of escape agents and fell victim to criminal acts for that reason, the victimisation variables we
construct would to some extent capture this choice. It would then be possible that the faster
labour market integration of victimised individuals is caused by their attempt to recover the
relatively high cost of the journey as soon as possible once they reach the destination country.
To test this hypothesis, we approximate the level of financial precariousness of refugees in
Germany by the extent to which they state to be very worried about their personal finances
when arriving in Germany. The regression outcome is shown in table 24.
Very worried about finances Cross Section Panel Data
Benchmark Fixed effects Benchmark Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Physical victim. 0.0149 0.00991 0.0295 0.0246
(0.0217) (0.0233) (0.0186) (0.0210)
Financial victim. 0.0310 0.0413* 0.0332* 0.0450**
(0.0210) (0.0221) (0.0180) (0.0199)
Observations 2,180 2,180 3,380 3,380
R-squared 0.102 0.194
C. of origin x Y-M left origin FE No Yes No Yes
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Huber–White standard errors
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
The dependent variable is binary and takes the value 1 for individuals who state they are "very concerned about their finances"
at the time of the interview. The cross-sectional regressions are run on the first available observation of each individual, 19
months after arrival on average.
Table 24: Very worried about finances
We do not detect an effect of physical victimisation on financial hardship at any conven-
tional statistical level. Unsurprisingly, financially victimised refugees are indeed more likely
to voice concern about their financial situation, an effect most pronounced shortly after ar-
rival (column (1) and (2)). In our preferred specification of column (2), the magnitude of the
effect is an excess 4.5 percentage points over other refugee groups.
7.3 Intention to remain in Germany
If victimised individuals intend to stay for a relatively shorter duration than non-victimised
individuals because the difficult journey discouraged them, they could be more likely to seek
low-skill employment quickly instead of investing into host-country specific human capital.
The hypothesis follows directly from the classic human capital investment model for migrants
which posits that the longer migrants intend to stay, the more they invest into host-country
specific education and the less likely they are to take up low-skill employment [Cortes, 2004].
We test this mechanism by analysing differences in refugees’ intention to stay in Germany
upon arrival in table 25.
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Intention to stay in GER Cross Section Panel Data
Benchmark Fixed effects Benchmark Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Physical victim. -0.0204 -0.0159 -0.0245** -0.0178
(0.0125) (0.0136) (0.0106) (0.0126)
Financial victim. 0.00567 0.00424 0.00662 0.00650
(0.0116) (0.0128) (0.00991) (0.0117)
Observations 2,180 2,180 3,380 3,380
R-squared 0.055 0.126
C. of origin x Y-M left origin FE No Yes No Yes
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Huber–White standard errors
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
The dependent variable is binary and takes the value 1 for individuals who state they are "intend to stay in Germany perma-
nently" at the time of the interview. The cross-sectional regressions are run on the first available observation of each individual,
19 months after arrival on average.
Table 25: Intention to stay in GER
We first note that the cross-sectional regressions run on the first available observation after
arrival to Germany shown in columns (1) and (2) are most informative: At later stages of
the time spent in Germany, the intention to stay in Germany may become endogenous to our
outcomes of interest. If individuals don’t manage to integrate economically, they may have a
lower propensity to remain in the host country. Our results lend only suggestive support to
the hypothesis that the physical victimisation event during the journey to Germany decreases
the likelihood of wanting to stay in Germany. Our preferred specification of column (2) shows
a small and statistically insignificant negative effect of physical victimisation on the likelihood
of wanting to stay in the country. All other panel specifications confirm these results; even if
the more imprecisely estimated coefficients can partly be explained by the relatively smaller
sample size due to missing values in the response, the magnitude of the effect is too small to
explain the observed differences between physically victimised migrants and others.
8 Conclusion
One of the key features of humanitarian migration flows from developing into developed re-
gions of the world has been the extreme conditions under which these movements take place.
While it is clear that it is exactly the perilous journey itself that limits and deters migration
flows, the unintended consequences of such restrictive policies are not yet well understood.
In this paper, we analyse how victimisation on asylum seekers’ flight to safety, a direct
consequence of restrictive migration policies, interacts with labour market outcomes in the
destination country. We first show that physical and to a lesser extent financial victimisation
events that occurred during the escape journey negatively affect the mental well-being and
health among the refugee population in Germany at the time of arrival. In a second step, we
then show that physical victimisation in particular distorts trajectories of economic activity
in the destination countries at the internal margin: Physically victimised individuals join
the labour force faster through the uptake of part-time or marginal employment instead of
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investing into host-country specific human capital. We do not find a similar effect for finan-
cially victimised refugees, suggesting that, in line with the previous victimisation literature,
the act of physical victimisation has relatively stronger effects on life trajectories. Financially
victimised experience financial hardship in relatively larger numbers when arriving at their
destination, but we do not detect a distortion on economic activity in the host-country.
We conceptualise our findings as a "loss of future directedness", a concept closely related
to that of "impatience" (e.g. higher time discounting rates) in the economics literature:
Events of physical victimisation lead to less forward-looking decision-making. In the frame-
work of the migrant-specific human capital investment model, this can be seen as a distortion
to the trade-off refugees face upon arrival to either invest into education to get access to higher
quality employment at a later stage or take up lower-quality employment shortly after ar-
rival. These distortions are considerable in magnitude: Three years after arrival, refugees
who were physically victimised during their journey are more than 5 percentage points more
likely to have joined the labour force to work in low-income professions and are more than 3
percentage points less likely to pursue host-country specific education or training.
The results strongly suggest that entry restrictions to asylum seekers, while undoubtedly
limiting the numbers of new-arrivals, have short and long-run welfare implications for desti-
nation countries beyond those brought about by the absolute number of refugees they host.
The victimisation events reported by refugees in the surveys match those systematically mea-
sured around the EU’s external border, suggesting that at least some of the physical violence
inflicted on asylum seekers is directly carried out by border agents [Arsenijević et al., 2017].
Our findings imply that these deterrent measures have consequences for the mental well-being
of asylum seekers that extend into their economic integration in the host-country. In this
context, we note that one limitation of our study is that the sample only consists of newly
arrived refugees. Distortions to the optimal timing of labour market entry are likely to result
in larger welfare losses to the host-country in the medium to long-term. The magnitude of
these distortions is in turn linked to other variables, such as return migration patterns among
refugees. Revisiting and quantifying the economic cost of victimisation events at a later stage
is therefore a promising avenue for future research.
In addition to uncovering potentially costly repercussions of restrictive migration policies
for optimal labour market trajectories in the destination, all of our findings also cast doubt
on the notion of a swift labour market integration as a success metric for refugees more gen-
erally. While clearly useful to judge the efficacy of supportive integration policies, we show
that the speed of labour market integration on the aggregate also reflects unintended con-
sequences of policies that serve entirely different purposes. Headline figures on labour force
participation and employment among refugees should therefore be cross-referenced with the
type of employment individuals engage in, and the potential loss in human capital stemming
from distorted educational investment decisions.
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Appendices
A Mental and physical health scores
The mental and physical health scores are constructed strictly following Jacobsen et al.
[2017], who describe all necessary calculations in detail (p.23-24). A higher score reflects
better health. The mental health scale (MCS) is based on the following questions:
• Did you feel in low spirits and melancholy?
• Did you feel calm and balanced?
• Did you feel full of energy?
• Due to psychological or emotional problems, did you achieve less in your work or
everyday activities than you actually intended?
• Due to psychological problems or emotional problems, did you perform your work or
everyday activities less carefully than usual?
• Due to health or psychological problems, have you been restricted in terms of your
social contact to for example friends, acquaintances or relatives?
The response scale for all questions related to the mental scale is 1 (Very often), 2 (Often),
3 (Sometimes), 4 (Almost never), 5 (Never).
The physical health scale (PCS) is based on the following questions:
• How would you describe your current state of health (scale: 1 (Poor) to 5 (Very Well))?
• If you have to climb stairs, i.e. walk up several floors: Does your state of health restrict
you (scale: 1 (A lot), 2 (A little), 3 (Not at all))?
• What about other strenuous activities in everyday life, e.g. when you have to lift
something heavy or need to be mobile: Does your state of health restrict you a lot, a
little or not at all (scale: 1 (A lot), 2 (A little), 3 (Not at all))?
• How often in the last four weeks did you suffer from severe physical pain?
• How often in the last four weeks, due to health problems of a physical nature, did you
achieve less in your work or everyday activities than you actually intended?
• How often in the last four weeks, due to health problems of a physical nature, have you
been restricted in the type of tasks you can perform in your work or everyday activities?
The response scale for the last three questions is 1 (Very often), 2 (Often), 3 (Sometimes), 4
(Almost never), 5 (Never).
The regression results of the effect of victimisation on the outcomes are shown in tables
26 and 27.
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Mental Scale Cross Section Panel Data
Benchmark Fixed effects Dyadic FE PDS Benchmark Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physical victim. -1.033* -1.202** -1.059 -1.641*** -0.975** -1.082**
(0.527) (0.557) (0.742) (0.546) (0.440) (0.471)
Financial trauma -1.495*** -1.643*** -2.454*** -0.599 -1.130*** -1.342***
(0.497) (0.537) (0.741) (0.521) (0.422) (0.459)
Observations 2,235 2,225 1,677 2,127 4,814 4,814
R-squared 0.153 0.230 0.307
C. of origin x Y-M left origin FE No Yes Yes Some No Yes
R. origin x Y-M left origin x Y-M arrival FE No No Yes No No No
Year-month arrival FE No No Yes No No No
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Huber–White standard errors
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
The dependent variable is a mental health score on a scale from 0 to 100 at the time of the interview. The cross-sectional
regressions are run on the first available observation of each individual. Results are only shown for our preferred specification,
corresponding to column (2) in the main result tables. The term FE indicates fixed effects. The term Y-M left origin refers to
the year-month of forceful displacement from the home country. Y-M arrival refers to the year-month of arrival in Germany. C.
of origin is the country of origin, R. of origin is the wider region of origin as shown in table 5.
Table 26: Mental Scale
Physical Scale Cross Section Panel Data
Benchmark Fixed effects Dyadic FE PDS Benchmark Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physical victim. -0.850** -1.194*** -1.056* -1.203*** -0.909** -1.264***
(0.423) (0.449) (0.604) (0.450) (0.364) (0.393)
Financial trauma -0.730* -0.640 -0.435 -0.531 -0.225 -0.328
(0.411) (0.441) (0.594) (0.434) (0.354) (0.384)
Observations 2,235 2,225 1,677 2,127 4,814 4,814
R-squared 0.258 0.323 0.383
C. of origin x Y-M left origin FE No Yes Yes Some No Yes
R. origin x Y-M left origin x Y-M arrival FE No No Yes No No No
Year-month arrival FE No No Yes No No No
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Huber–White standard errors
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
The dependent variable is a physical health score on a scale from 0 to 100 at the time of the interview. The cross-sectional
regressions are run on the first available observation of each individual. Results are only shown for our preferred specification,
corresponding to column (2) in the main result tables. The term FE indicates fixed effects. The term Y-M left origin refers to
the year-month of forceful displacement from the home country. Y-M arrival refers to the v of arrival in Germany. C. of origin
is the country of origin, R. of origin is the wider region of origin as shown in table 5.
Table 27: Physical Scale
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B Least absolute shrinkage and selection operators
While the main strength of supervised machine learning methods, such as the least absolute
shrinkage and selection operators (LASSO) is prediction, they can be used to select control
variables to address omitted variable bias when many potential controls are available [Tib-
shirani, 1996]. These methods also allow us to consider interactions and non-linearities that
theory-driven specifications typically omit. Starting with a general model yi = x′iβ + εi, the





(yi − x′iβ)2 + λ
p∑
j=1
| βj |, (2)
with i = 1, ..., n observations and j = 1, ..., p regressors. There are up to p = dim(β) potential
regressors. Here p can be very large, potentially even p > n.
The second term of equation (3) represents the cost of including many regressors. λ is
the penalization term.11 The effect of the penalization is that LASSO sets the β̂js of the
variables that contribute little to the model fit to zero.
Belloni et al. [2014a] developed a ’post-double selection’ (PDS) method, in which the
underlying idea is to estimate separate LASSO regressions to find predictors of the selection
equation and the outcome equation using ’rigorous’ penalization. The final equation then
includes the union of the variables chosen as controls from the previous step.
In our setting with two variables of interest, PhysicalV ictim (PT ) and FinancialV ictim
(FT ), we amend this method to a post-triple selection. The first step in this procedure is to
estimate the outcome equation (labour market outcomes) using LASSO, without including
PT nor FT :
Yi,f,c,t = x
′
i,f,c,tβj + εi,f,c,t, (3)
where we denote the set of LASSO-selected controls by A. The vector xi,f,c,t these controls are
selected from include a large set of time constant and time varying individual characteristics,
country of origin fixed effects, year-month fixed effects, year-quarter fixed effects, and the
interaction between all these variables.
The second step is to estimate the probability of physical victimisation:
PTi,c,t = x
′
i,c,tδj + εi,f,c,t, (4)
where we denote the set of LASSO-selected controls by B.
The third step is to estimate the probability of financial victimisation:
FTi,c,t = x
′
i,c,tηj + εi,f,c,t, (5)
where we denote the set of LASSO-selected controls by C.
The final step is to use OLS to estimate
Yi,f,c,t = γ1PTi + γ2FTi + w
′
i,f,c,tβj + εi,f,c,t, (6)
11There are three main approaches to choose λ: cross-validation [Chetverikov et al., 2019], ’rigorous’
penalization [Belloni et al., 2014a] and information criteria (AIC, AICc, BIC or EBIC).
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where wi,f,c,t is the union of the selected controls from steps 1,2 and 3 (e.g., wi,f,c,t = A∪B∪C).
Belloni et al. [2014a] argue that LASSO can be used to select controls because moderate
model selection mistakes of the LASSO do not affect the asymptotic properties of the estima-
tor of the low-dimensional parameters of interest. Hence, modelling the nuisance component
of our structural model can be seen as a prediction problem [Andersen et al., 2008].
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C Employment outcomes - in labour force
Any employment Full-time Part-time or marginal
Cross S. Panel D. Cross S. Panel D. Cross S. Panel D.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physical victim. 0.0317 0.0225 0.00658 0.00814 0.0252 0.0141
(0.0245) (0.0189) (0.0194) (0.0149) (0.0206) (0.0156)
Financial victim. 0.0140 0.0119 0.0142 0.00721 -0.000255 0.00493
(0.0242) (0.0179) (0.0193) (0.0140) (0.0199) (0.0149)
Observations 1,679 3,344 1,679 3,344 1,679 3,344
R-squared 0.297 0.249 0.189
C. of origin x Y-M left origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Huber–White standard errors
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
The dependent variable is binary and captures all employed individuals inside the labour force, with regressions showing em-
ployment outcomes for any employment ((1) and (2)), full-time employment ((3) and (4)) and part-time or marginal employment
((5) and (6)). All other types of employment are set to zero in regressions (2)-(6). Columns (1), (3) and (5) show the results of
a cross-sectional regression on the last interview conducted. Columns (2), (4) and (6) are estimated on the panel using random
effects. The term FE indicates fixed effects. The term Y-M left origin refers to the year-month of forceful displacement from
the home country.
Table 28: Employment
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D Full Results
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